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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now well recognized that state courts may interpret
their constitutions to provide different and more extensive rights
than those provided by the federal constitution.2 Although state
courts have always possessed this power, the recent, highly visi-
2. See generally Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1982), and materials cited therein [hereinafter
cited as Developments in the Law]. For more recent articles, see Abrahamson, Reincar-
nation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982); Carson, "Last Things Last". A Method-
ological Approach to Legal Arguments in State Courts, 19 WILLIAETME L.J. 641 (1983);
Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal Pro-
cedure Rights and the New Federalism, 1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L. Rv. 221 (1982/83);
Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33
SvaAcsE L. REV. 731 (1982) [hereinafter cited as The Other Supreme Courts]; Meisel,
The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAw & CoN'rMP. PROBS. 7
(1982); Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Con-
stitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 491
(1984); Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 169, 171-
73, 185-95 (1983); Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin Constitution: Presentation of
Constitutional Questions in State Courts, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 483.
For an excellent bibliography on state constitutional law, see Collins, Special Sec-
tion, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 1984 pp. 25-32.
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SUPREME COURT'S SHADOW
ble independent interpretation cases involving criminal proce-
dure, abortion financing, and freedom of expression have fo-
cused attention on state courts as constitutional decisionmakers.
This attention has raised questions about the legitimacy' of
state court decisions rejecting Supreme Court reasoning and re-
sult. These legitimacy questions in state cases "evading"4 Su-
preme Court precedent are encouraging some state courts to for-
mulate standards or criteria by which to justify their rejection of
Supreme Court decisions.5
The legitimacy of a state court decision interpreting a state
constitutional provision is not questioned in cases dealing with
such areas as government structure or separation of powers.6
Nor does the question of legitimacy arise in cases involving the
many state constitutional provisions to which no comparable or
analogous federal constitutional provision exists.7 Arguments
about independence do not arise in these situations simply be-
cause there is nothing from which the state courts need to assert
independence. Also, state courts need not exercise independence
-3. In this Article, "legitimacy" refers to the debated propriety of state courts reach-
ing results under their constitutions which are contrary to prior Supreme Court decisions
rendered under similar or identical federal constitutional provisions. As to the ongoing
debate over "legitimacy" in federal judicial review, see Constitutional Adjudication and
Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); Judicial Review and the Constitu-
tion-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 443 (1983); Judicial Review Versus
Democracy, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
4. See Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873
n.2 (1975)(referring to "evasion cases")[hereinafter cited as More on the New Federal-
ism]; Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
5. This search is not really new. See Gabriella v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89,
82 P.2d 391, 393 (1938), appeal dismissed, 306 U.S. 621 (1939): "Cogent reasons must
exist before a state court in construing a provision of the state constitution will depart
from the construction placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar
provision of the federal constitution." See also People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 118,
545 P.2d 272, 283-84, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 371 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting); Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 286, 288, 376 N.E.2d 582, 583 (1978);
State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 183, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (1974).
6. Justice Holmes once said: "We shall assume that when, as here, a state constitu-
tion sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing...
to hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned." Prentis v. Atlan-
tic Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210, 255 (1908). See also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1937). These Supreme Court decisions, however, are not
the source of the state's power to structure its government as it wishes; rather, they
merely recognize that inherent power. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
7. Williams, supra note 2, at 188-89. See generally Galie, The Other Supreme
Courts, supra note 2, at 734-53.
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when the Supreme Court has previously invalidated a state pol-
icy similar to the one currently before the state courts.8
The perceived legitimacy problem arises only when the
United States Supreme Court has upheld state legislative or ex-
ecutive action under a federal constitutional provision which is
similar or identical to a state constitutional provision. The Su-
preme Court decision casts a shadow over subsequent state liti-
gation on what otherwise would be purely a question of state
constitutional interpretation. The shadow seems to create a pre-
sumption of correctness, thus requiring a state court clearly to
articulate reasons justifying a contrary result. In other words,
the Supreme Court decision is sometimes viewed as presump-
tively applicable to state constitutional interpretation. This pre-
sumption is not necessarily based on the persuasiveness of the
Supreme Court's reasoning, but rather on its position as the
highest court in the land. Under these circumstances, state
judges, counsel, and commentators are beginning to formulate
criteria by which to justify a state court decision which reaches a
result contrary to the Supreme Court's.
The perceived need for such apparently neutral standards
of justification is not surprising. Many state judges are not used
to rendering controversial constitutional rulings-a role much
more closely associated in the public mind with federal judges.9
Further, the concern that the Supreme Court would one day
erode the "adequate and independent state ground doctrine," 10
which insulates state court11 interpretations of the state consti-
tution from Supreme Court review, 2 has now been realized."3
8. See infra text accompanying note 26.
9. But see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
10. See Williams, supra note 2, at 193-94.
11. Even federal court interpretations of state constitutions may be insulated. See
City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982), on remand, 701 F.2d 524
(5th Cir. 1983).
12. This ever-present possibility has been noted by several commentators. See, e.g.,
Wilkes, More on the New Federalism, supra note 4, at 892-94; Wilkes, The New Feder-
alism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729, 749-52 (1976); Welsh, Whose
Federalism?-Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. - (1983); Collins, High Court Reasserts Its Authority, NAT'L L.J. 13
(May 16, 1983):
During oral arguments last term, for example, counsel for a defendant
claiming state and federal constitutional protection addressed the court by as-
serting flatly- "I think... state courts should be more innovative." Character-
istic of the increasingly prevalent attitude, the comment elicited a chilly retort-
[Vol. 35
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State courts may fear further erosion if their decisions are
viewed as merely evading Supreme Court precedent. Finally,
state constitutional decisions are more likely than federal deci-
sions to be "overruled" by constitutional amendment.14 By justi-
fying their rejection of Supreme Court decisions, state courts
may believe they can diffuse such adverse voter reaction to inde-
pendent state constitutional interpretation.15
For these reasons, state judges may be particularly sensitive,
and even defensive, to charges that their decisions are result ori-
ented16 or that their disagreement with the Supreme Court is
based purely on ideological differences 1i These charges are typi-
cally leveled by dissenters" or by those who merely disagree
"By innovative, do you mean ignore the opinions of this court?"
See also Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750, 758-61
(1972).
13. In Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, articulated a new formulation of the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine:
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when
the adequacy and independence of any state law ground is not clear from the
face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law
required it to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal prece-
dents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only
make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal
cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves
compel the result that the court has reached.
Id. at 3476. See generally Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme Court's New Re-
quirement, 70 A.B.A.J. 92 (1984); Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTE DAME
LAw. - (1984); Welsh, supra note 12. See also Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852
(1984).
14. See infra notes 134-151 and accompanying text. See also Barrett, Anderson and
the Judicial Function, 45 S. CAL. L. RE V. 739, 749 (1972), where the author argues that
the California Supreme Court was "risking ... its power and prestige" by overturning
the death penalty in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 890, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1972).
15. But see infra text accompanying note 147.
16. One commentator reported charges that "state courts are evading Supreme
Court doctrine and engaging in unprincipled, result-oriented use of their state constitu-
tions." Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State
Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 297 (1977).
17. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts, supra note 2, at 786.
18. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 197-203, 622 P.2d 1199, 1216-17
(1980)(Horowitz, J., dissenting); and cases cited in Note, supra note 16, at 297 n.7. Dis-
senters have leveled such charges even where textual differences between the federal and
state constitutions exist, the most compelling justification for independent state consti-
5
Williams: In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of S
Published by Scholar Commons, 1984
358 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
with the state court's substantive result.19 Nevertheless, these
are the kinds of pressures that have forced state courts to de-
velop standards or criteria by which to justify an independent
state constitutional interpretation which arguably conflicts with
a prior Supreme Court interpretation of a similar or identical
federal constitutional provision.20
tutional interpretation. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d 252, 297, 625 P.2d 779, 806, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 893 (1981)(Richardson, J., dis-
senting); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1981)(Alderman, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 176, 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (1981)(Larsen, J., dissent-
ing); Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315, 318-20 (Utah 1980)(Stewart, J., dissenting); State
v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 403-407, 617 P.2d 720, 728-31 (1980)(Rosellini, J., dissenting).
See generally Singer, Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence, 35 RUTGEzS L. Rv. 275,
276 (1983):
Judges are accused of illegitimate "activism" when they decide cases
which involve highly controversial and politicized issues. These accusations in-
variably come from individuals who disagree with the outcomes of those cases.
Rather than criticize the outcomes directly, they claim that the court over-
stepped its institutional bounds by deciding issues which should be left to the
political process.
See also Galie, The Other Supreme Courts, supra note 2, at 262 n.254; Tushnet, Follow-
ing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983). Of course, even though judges are aware of this, they still
search for rationales or justifications to diffuse even rn-founded charges of illegitimate
judicial activism.
19. See, e.g., Deukmejian and Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review
Under the California Constitution, 6 HAsTINGs CONsT. L.Q. 975 (1979)(accusing the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court of reaching result-oriented decisions). Mr. Deukmejian was the
California Attorney General, and Mr. Thompson one of his assistants, during much of
the California Supreme Court's independent constitutional interpretation of the 1970s.
They represented the losing side of many such cases. Ron Collins and Bob Welsh
observed:
But politics, rather than legal principle, is behind Deukmejian's insistence that
the court establish a "principled basis for repudiating federal precedent"
before considering reliance on the state Constitution. He himself does not
abide by that policy in his own office. For example, in his novel Los Angeles
school violence lawsuit, Deukmejian is quick to invoke state constitutional law.
The suit is replete with claims that many observers believe are unlikely to be
sustained under federal law. Like the state Supreme Court justices he criti-
cizes, Deukmejian is willing to acknowledge the independent status of Califor-
nia's Constitution only when it suits him.
Collins and Welsh, The California Constitution Turns Into a Political Toy, Los Angeles
Times, July 17, 1980, Part II p.7.
See also Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wis. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 605 n.1 (1981): "I must confess to some misgivings about the extent to
which some of this commentary seems to assume that state constitutional law is simply
'available' to be manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed
unsatisfactory."
20. A recent study concluded: "[D]issatisfaction with the federal reasoning or result,
6
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This Article examines the phenomenon of state rejection of
Supreme Court reasoning and result, provides a case study on
the state abortion fnancing cases rejecting Harris v. McRae,21
and presents a theoretical framework for analyzing this recent
phenomenon. It contrasts federal' and state judicial review and
evaluates the emerging trend of developing criteria to justify di-
verging state constitutional decisions. Finally, the Article criti-
cizes this movement to formulate criteria as premature, stifling,
and ultimately counterproductive.
II. A NEW MODEL OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Persons not attentive to the distinctions between federal
and state constitutional law might view United States Supreme
Court decisions as enunciating the final, definitive constitutional
law regarding the validity of state policies.22 Under this view,
Supreme Court decisions represent the end of the constitutional
decisionmaking process. 23 Other persons, recognizing the state
is often the most significant factor in stimulating elaboration of state constitutional doc-
trine, although it is also the factor with which courts and commentators seem most un-
comfortable." Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1359 (footnotes omitted). An-
other commentator concluded that "[t]he largest single group of state cases can be
categorized as being based on ideological disagreement." Galie, The Other Supreme
Courts, supra note 2, at 779.
21. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For a similar treatment of state court rejection of Supreme
Court decisions in the search and seizure context, see Hancock, State Court Activism
and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. Rv. 1085, 1121-28 (1982). See also Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1419-1429.
22. "Characteristically, questions of constitutional law and questions of the role of
the Supreme Court are generally treated as the same thing." Linde, Judges, Critics, and
the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). See also id., at 251; Martyn, Book Re-
view, 33 J. LEo. ED. 164, 165 (1983): "Publishing a book about current medical-legal
issues always runs the risk of becoming moot should a court decisively rule on a particu-,
lar topic. That risk materialized when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae, rendering most of Kaufman's article irrele-
vant." (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 166-67.
23. In the area of Medicaid funding for abortion, much legislative and judicial activ-
ity, beginning prior to the original 1976 Hyde Amendment, preceded the 1980 Harris v.
McRae decision. See generally Butler, The Right to Abortion Under Medicaid, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 713 (1974); Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 931 (1977); Law, Reproductive Freedom Issues in Legal Services Prac-
tice, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 389 (1978); Wallace, Goldstein, Gold and Ogelsby, A Study
of Title 19 Coverage of Abortion, 62 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 1116 (1972); Note, Abortion,
Medicaid, and the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 120 (1979). See also Kaufman, Abor-
tion: Divisive U.S. Public Policy in MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PuBLIc POLICY 375, 381-82 (M. Hiller ed. 1981)(indicating that state and hospital policies
19841 359
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court trend of resorting to independent interpretations of their
constitutions in the face of contrary Supreme Court holdings,
might view the Court's decisions as the beginning of the states'
independent constitutional decisionmaking process.24
This Article's thesis is that Supreme Court federal constitu-
tional interpretations represent the middle of an evolving pro-
cess of constitutional decisionmaking in our federal system. The
ongoing legal and political controversy following Supreme Court
decisions holding against asserted federal constitutional rights
illustrates an emerging new paradigm of judicial review in cases
concerning state activities.2 5 The process begins with a series of
lower court rulings on federal constitutional challenges to state
legislative or executive action. These cases eventually lead to a
United States Supreme Court ruling on the federal constitu-
thwarted numerous Medicaid recipients' attempts to obtain abortions even before the
Hyde Amendment).
For state legislative activity after the Hyde Amendment, but prior to Harris v. Mc-
Rae, see Nicholson and Stewart, The Supreme Court, Abortion Policy, and State Re-
sponse: A Preliminary Analysis, 8 PUBLIUS 159 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Analysis]; Stewart and Nicholson, Abortion Policy in 1978: A Follow-Up Analysis, 9
PUBLIUS 161 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Follow-Up Analysis]; Note, Limiting Public
Funds for Abortions: State Response to Congressional Action, 13 SuFr. U.L. Rxv. 923
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Limiting Public Funds for Abortions].
Between 1976 and 1980, the period between the adoption of the Hyde Amendment
and the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. McRae, many states provided full funding
for Medicaid abortions. Mendelson and Domolky, The Courts and Elective Abortions
Under Medicaid, 54 Soc. SERv. Rzv. 124 n.1 (1980)(reporting coverage by seventeen
states and the District of Columbia); Palley, Abortion Policy: Ideology, Political Cleav-
age and the Policy Process, 7 POL'Y STuD.J. 224, 228 (1978)(reporting, as of March 1978,
coverage by sixteen states and the District of Columbia).
24. See generally Developments in the Low, supra note 2. This work specifically
recognizes the early state abortion financing decisions. Id. at 1434, 1442-43. See also
Williams, supra note 2, at 192 n.104; Note, Abortion Funding Restrictions: State Consti-
tutional Protections Exceed Federal Safeguards, 39 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 1469 (1982).
25. Until recently, only Oregon adopted Justice Linde's pure "first things first" ap-
proach, see infra note 55, relying on the state constitution even where the Supreme
Court's federal constitutional interpretations would afford the relief requested. See Hew-
itt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 970, 974-75 (1982)(criticizing "ap-
parent inconsistency" and the "kaleidoscope of standards and rationales" in Supreme
Court sex discrimination cases, and looking instead to state constitution); Comment,
State Constitutional Analysis of Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities: Gen-
der Discrimination in Oregon, 19 WLIAmErrE L.J. 757 (1983). Recently, several other
states have followed this approach. See People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 IM. 2d 137, 461
N.E.2d 410 (1984)(Simon, J., specially concurring); State v. Cadman, - A.2d - (Me.
1984); State v. Ball, - N.H. -, 471 A.2d 347 (1983); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450
A.2d 336 (1982); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
360 [Vol. 35
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tional question."6 If the Supreme Court upholds the federal chal-
lenge (striking down the state policy), the decision establishes a
minimum national standard applicable in every state. But if the
Court rejects the asserted federal challenge (upholding the state
policy), the decision now triggers a series of "second looks" at
the question by state-level decisionmakers, including the courts,
based on state legal and policy arguments. During this second
stage, the Supreme Court decision, while certainly not control-
ling,27 continues to play an integral role in the unfolding state
legislative, executive, and judicial decisions. Supreme Court dis-
senting opinions on the question play an equally important
role.28
Supreme Court decisions rejecting federal constitutional
challenges to state policies are being subjected to "second looks"
in state courts or legislatures more often than ever before. This
trend, and the presumptive validity accompanying Supreme
Court decisions, has produced the movement among state
judges, counsel, and commentators to develop criteria by which
state courts may justify decisions which reach results that are
contrary to or different than the Supreme Court's. 9
It should now be obvious that United States Supreme Court
decisions do not represent the final step in the constitutional
decisionmaking process surrounding any issue concerning state
policy. For example, as a result of state legislative, executive,
and judicial decisions, medical assistance programs in states
with approximately seventy-five percent of the nation's eligible
population still provide state funding for most abortions,3" de-
26. For an interesting evaluation of Supreme Court "doctrine," see Maltz, The Con-
cept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. Rnv. 357 (1982). See
also Linde, supra note 22, at 245-47 (criticizing "animistic" view of Warren Court).
27. State courts frequently observe that the Supreme Court's federal constitutional
interpretations are not binding on state court interpretations of state constitutions. See
infra note 56 and accompanying text. This view must be contrasted with state courts'
"evasion" of far-reaching Supreme Court decisions during the 1950s and 1960s. See infra
note 43 and accompanying text.
Of course, analogous litigation under state constitutions cannot follow all federal
constitutional decisions. For example, interpretations of the treaty clause, or other
uniquely federal provisions, cannot be duplicated under state constitutions.
28. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 16-20 and accompanying text.
30. Brozan, Plan Casts Doubt on Abortion Aid, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1982, at 2, col.
6. See also Cates, The Hyde Amendment in Action, 246 J.A.M.A. 1109 (1981); The Issue
That Won't Go Away, NzwswEEK, Jan. 31, 1983, p. 31.
1984]
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spite the United States Supreme Court's 1980 holding in Harris
v. McRae that termination of this funding did not violate the
federal constitution.3 1 These state decisions rejecting Harris il-
lustrate the newly emerging model of American constitutional
law.
A. The Shadow of the Supreme Court Majority, and
Justification for State Court Disagreement
After Congress passed the Hyde Amendment as an appro-
priations rider in 1976,32 many states passed similar statutes re-
stricting the use of state funds for abortion.," The Hyde Amend-
ment prohibited the use of Medicaid funds for abortion except
when carrying the fetus to term would endanger the mother's
life or when the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Liti-
gants soon filed suit in federal courts 4 attacking35 the Hyde
31. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
32. For a discussion of the congressional procedure that permitted adoption of the
Hyde Amendment as an appropriations rider-a floor amendment-rather than as a sub-
stantive amendment to the Medicaid Act, see Davidson, Procedures and Politics in Con-
gress, in THE ABORTION DisPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, 30, 37-46 (G. Steiner ed.
1983); Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and
Informal Practices, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 51, 74-77 (1979); Note, Limiting Public Funds
for Abortions, supra note 23, at 938-40.
33. See generally Comment, The Hyde Amendment: An Analysis of its State Prog-
eny, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1980). Interestingly, many state constitutions arguably
prohibit enacting substantive legislation, such as the Hyde Amendment, through the use
of appropriation riders. See generally Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More than One
Subject," 42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 413 (1958); Williams, supra note 2, at 204 n.154. See
also Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 911, 370 N.E.2d 1350 (1977)(upholding guberna-
torial veto of appropriations rider limiting abortion funding).
34. The choice of forum is, of course, often controlled by litigants. For the general
arguments concerning resort to federal courts under these circumstances, compare
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); and Neuborne, Toward
Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981), with
Bator, supra note 19; Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial
Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 175 (1980); and Solimine and Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Fed-
eral and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HAsT. CONsT. L.Q.
213 (1983).
In many circumstances, however, where the state initiates proceedings in state court
against a person, federal arguments must be raised in that forum. See Bator, supra note
19, at 609-10.
35. Some state court litigation was initiated on nonconstitutional state grounds. See,
e.g., State Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (unsuccessful attempt to require expenditure of appropriated state funds for
10
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Amendment and similar state statutes on federal statutory and
constitutional grounds."
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court upheld several
earlier state statutes restricting the use of public funds for abor-
tion. 7 Then, in 1980 the Court upheld Congress' termination of
almost all Medicaid" funds for poor women's abortions in Har-
ris v. McRae. 9 By a 5-4 vote, the Court in Harris upheld the
federal statutory limitations contained in the Hyde Amend-
ment.40 In a companion case, Williams v. Zbaraz,41 the Court
full abortion coverage). See also People v. Florendo, 95 IM. 2d 155, 447 N.E.2d 282
(1983)(upholding grand jury subpoena of names of abortion clinic patients); Kindley v.
Governor of Maryland, 289 Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981)(upholding legislature's power
to fund elective abortions after Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)); Stain v. State, 47
N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), affd in part and rev'd in part, 302 N.C. 357, 275
S.E.2d 439 (1981)(same).
36. Initially, funding proponents tried to establish a governmental obligation under
the federal constitution to provide funding for abortion for poor women even in the ab-
sence of Medicaid funding for childbirth. See Charles and Alexander, Abortions for Poor
and Nonwhite Women: A Denial of Equal Protection?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 147 (1971);
Comment, Abortion on Demand in a Post-Wade Context: Must the State Pay the Bills?,
41 FORDHAM L. REv. 921 (1973). These attempts were abandoned prior to Harris v. Mc-
Rae. Butler, supra note 23, at 938-39. See generally Carey, A Constitutional Right to
Health Care: An Unlikely Development, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 492 (1974).
In the state abortion financing cases, one state justice would have interpreted his
state constitution to require this funding. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287,
324-333, 450 A.2d 925, 944-49 (1982)(Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See Singer, supra note 18, at 283.
37. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)(upholding on constitutional grounds the fail-
ure to fund "elective" or nontherapeutic abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977)(up-
holding on statutory grounds the failure to fund "elective" or nontherapeutic abortions):
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)(upholding public hospital bar on nontherapeutic
abortions). Compare Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme
Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978)(criticizing the deci-
sions); and Perry, Correspondence, 33 STA. L. REv. 1190 (1981)(same), with Fahy, The
Abortion Funding Cases: A Response to Professor Perry, 67 GEo. L.J. 1205 (1979)(de-
fending the decisions); Westen, Correspondence, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1981)(same);
and Tushnet, supra note 18, at 811-14 (criticizing Perry's "neutral principles" argu-
ment). See also Friedman, The Conflict Over Legitimacy in THE ABORTION DIsPuTE AND
THE AmE cAN SYSTEM, 13, 25 (G. Steiner ed. 1983); Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the
Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 107,
146-55 (1982), and materials cited therein.
38. For descriptions of the Medicaid program, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
301-03 (1980); Butler, supra note 23, at 301-03.
39. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See infra note 178. A new round of federal constitutional
litigation is now aimed at state restrictions on funding for organizations that offer abor-
tion counseling or referrals. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938
(9th Cir. 1983).
40. For a discussion of the Hyde Amendment in its various versions, see Appleton,
11
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upheld a similar Illinois statutory restriction on Medicaid funds
for abortion. The Supreme Court's decisions foreclosed future
federal statutory and constitutional attacks. The Supreme
Court's interpretation, although severely criticized,42 binds both
federal and state courts on the federal constitutional question.43
These decisions thus concluded the first stage of the ongoing
constitutional decisionmaking process described earlier.
After McRae supporters of Medicaid-funded abortions ini-
tiated litigation in state courts challenging the state statutes on
state constitutional grounds." To date, all state courts which
have considered the question of abortion financing have ordered
continuation of state funding under medical assistance pro-
grams. Thus far, no state court has agreed with either the result
or reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Mc-
Rae. The highest courts in California" and Massachusetts,'46 as
Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding
Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 721 n.3 (1981); Butler, supra note 23, at 942-43. See also supra note 23.
41. 448 U.S. 358 (1980). Both Harris and Williams were decided by the same 5-4
vote. In this Article, references will be to Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and are
intended to include Williams v. Zbaraz.
42. Compare Appleton, supra note 40, with Perry, Why the Supreme Court was
Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (1980)("THE COURT'S DECISION I McRae is more than merely
wrong. It borders on the shameful."); and Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of
Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 978 (1981).
43. Most studies of state court reactions to Supreme Court decisions focus on state
court attempts to avoid or evade "liberal" decisions of the 1950s and 1960s. See gener-
ally G. TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS (1977); L BECKER & M. FEE-
LEY, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2d ed. 1973); Tarr, State Supreme
Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Problem of Compliance, in STATE SUPREME
COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 155 (1982); Canon, Reactions of State
Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAW & Soc. REV.
109 (1973); Kramer and Riga, The New York Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court, 1960-76, 8 PUBLIUS 75 (1978); Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Su-
preme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1018 (1954). But see Gruhl, State Supreme
Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rulings, 72 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOL-
OGY 886 (1981).
44. The litigation culminating in Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d
925 (1982), was initiated well before the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. McRae
and was based on both federal and state grounds. For its procedural history, see Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 293-99, 450 A.2d at 928-31.
45. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d
779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). See Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers: Abortion Funding Restrictions as an Unconstitutional Condition 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 978 (1982); Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Medi-Cal
[Vol. 35
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well as a trial court in Connecticut, 7 have invalidated abortion
funding restrictions on state substantive due process grounds.
The New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the funding re-
striction as a denial of state equal protection, 8 while intermedi-
ate appeals courts in Pennsylvania 9 and Oregon50 have relied on
several grounds to reach similar results.
Theoretically, a state court may interpret its constitution
without reference to analogous federal constitutional doctrine.
Funding of Abortion, 8 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 361 (1978-79); Comment, Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: The Constitutionality of Conditions on Public
Benefits in California, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1475 (1982); Case Note, 20 J. FAM. L. 345 (1981-
82).
California Medicaid recipients have experienced difficulty enforcing Myers because
the California legislature continues to insert restrictive language in each year's Budget
Act. This necessitates annual litigation of the issue. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Re-
productive Rights v. Cory, 125 Cal. App. 3d 341, 178 Cal. Rptr. 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981),
on remand, 132 Cal. App. 3d 852, 183 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
46. Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
47. Doe v. Maher, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2006; Conn. L. Trib., (abridged opinion),
May 3, 1982, at 7, Col. 1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1981). See Berdon, Protecting Liberty
and Property Under the Connecticut and Federal Constitutions: The Due Process
Clauses, 15 CONN L. REv. 41, 46-50 (1982). Judge Robert L Berdon rendered the decision
in Doe v. Maher. See also Berdon, Protecting Individual Liberties Under the State Con-
stitution, 56 CONN. B.J. 236 (1982). Lower court opinions are not officially reported in
Connecticut.
Lower courts, as well as the highest state courts, often contribute to independent
state constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., People v. Goodwin, 69 Mich. App. 471, 245
N.W.2d 96 (1976). But see Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1331 n.3. (consid-
ering only states' highest courts); Comment, supra note 2, at 506-10 (criticizing state
supreme courts' limitations on trial court declarations of unconstitutionality).
48. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). See Collins, The
Move to Free State Courts From the 'Patomac's Ebb & Flow,' NAT'L L.J. Sept. 20, 1982
p. 28, Comment, 14 RuTGERS L.J. 217 (1982); Comment, 13 SEroN HALL L. REV. 779
(1983).
49. A single judge of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued a preliminary
injunction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this injunction without reaching
the merits in Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982).
Then, the Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, heard and denied the state's motion to
dismiss (called "preliminary objections" in Pennsylvania) by a 3-3 vote. Fischer v. De-
partment of Pub. Welfare, 66 Pa. Commw. 70,444 A.2d 774 (1982). The case was tried in
February 1984 and the court entered a permanent innunction against the funding
restrictions.
50. The Oregon case, Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Department of Human Re-
sources, 63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d 1247 (1983), was an original proceeding challenging an
administrative rule limiting abortion funding. The case is now pending on appeal in the
Oregon Supreme Court. Litigation was recently initiated in Vermont. Doc v. O'Rourke,
Docket No. 581-84 CNC, Chittenden Superior Court. A Temporary Restraining Order
was entered on Jan. 27, 1984.
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Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, and a current
majority of that court, believe that state constitutional chal-
lenges to state legislative or executive action should always be
addressed and resolved by state courts before they address fed-
eral constitutional challenges.51 A favorable ruling on a state
constitutional challenge removes any possible federal constitu-
tional violation and therefore obviates the necessity of address-
ing the federal constitutional arguments.5 2 The state courts in
the abortion funding cases, however, have not pursued this
approach.
The United States Supreme Court decided Harris v. McRae
before the state constitutional challenges were filed;5 3 the state
litigation was obviously a secondary tactic.5 4 Therefore, the Har-
ris majority and dissenting opinions have tended to cast a
shadow over, and set the agenda for, the state constitutional dis-
course concerning abortion funding restrictions. Although it is
possible for state courts under these circumstances to approach
the issue on Justice Linde's "first things first" basis,55 they have
51. See infra note 55.
52. See generally State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983), and materi-
als cited therein; Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 970 (1982).
53. But see supra note 44.
54. There is still a marked tendency among civil rights advocates to assert federal
constitutional arguments first. See supra note 34.
55. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OF. L. Rv.
125, 135 (1970)[hereinafter cited as Without "Due Process']:
Judicial review of official action under the state constitution thus is logically
prior to review of the effect of the state's total action (including rejection of
the state constitutional claim) under the fourteenth amendment. Claims raised
under the state constitution should always be dealt with and disposed of
before reaching a fourteenth amendment claim of deprivation of due process
or equal protection.
(emphasis in original). See also Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills
of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980)[hereinafter cited as First Things First]; Linde,
Book Review, 52 OF- L. Rav. 325, 332-41 (1973)(reviewing B. ScHWArwTz, THE BniL or
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971)). Contra, Kelman, Foreward: Rediscovering the
State Constitutional Bill of Rights, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 413, 429 (1981):
By proceeding from a failed federal claim to the question whether the state
constitution grants broader rights in the circumstances of the case, the state
court eliminates an ambiguity that otherwise might shroud its decision. It tells
us distinctly, and obliges the court to think more carefully about, whether and
why the state constitution differs from or retains the same meaning as the fed-
erally interpreted counterpart.
See also Developments In'the Law, supra note 2, at 1357:
When federal protections are extensive and well articulated, state court deci-
sionmaking that eschews consideration of, or reliance on, federal doctrine not
[Vol. 35
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not done so. Rather, the state courts, and counsel, have explored
the persuasiveness of the Harris decision5 in formulating rea-
sons for either accepting or rejecting it.
At its broadest level, the abortion funding question pro-
duces differing judicial perceptions of the constitutional contro-
versy.57 One either sees the abortion funding question as an at-
tempt by poor persons to obtain funding for the exercise of
constitutional rights (a very open-ended concept), or one sees
the Medicaid restrictions as discrimination in favor of childbirth
and against poor women's rights to choose abortion.8 These dif-
only will often be an inefficient route to an inevitable result, but also will lack
the cogency that a reasoned reaction to the federal view could provide, particu-
larly when parallel federal issues have been exhaustively discussed by the Su-
preme Court and commentators. In a community that perceives the Supreme
Court to be the primary interpreter of constitutional rights, reliance on Su-
preme Court reasoning can help to legitimate state constitutional decisions
that build on the federal base. When a state court diverges form the federal
view, a reasoned explanation of the divergence may be necessary if the decision
is to command respect.
For state constitutional law to assume a realistic role, state courts must
acknowledge the dominance of federal law and focus directly on the gap-filling
potential of state constitutions.
(footnotes omitted). State courts must now exercise extreme care after Michigan v. Long,
103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). See supra note 13. One commentator has described Justice
Linde's position as the "primacy approach." Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at
1356. See also infra note 116 and accompanying text.
Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 156, 432
A.2d 1382 (1981), presents a good illustration of a state court approaching a state consti-
tutional issue independently of the Supreme Court's federal constitutional
interpretations.
56. The state courts have emphasized that they are not bound by Harris v. McRae.
See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 257, 625 P.2d
779, 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 868 (1981); Doe v. Maher, slip. op. at 51; Moe v. Secretary of
Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 651,417 N.E.2d 387, 400 (1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne,
91 N.J. 287, 298-301, 450 A.2d 925, 930-32 (1982); Fischer v. Department of Pub. Wel-
fare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982); Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 66 Pa.
Commw. 70, 84, 444 A.2d 775, 781 (1982)("Harris v. McRae, as the decision of the high-
est court of a sister jurisdiction in which was resolved many of the issues here raised, can
afford this Court no more and no less than helpful guidance."). See infra note 248 and
accompanying text.
57. Cf., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 147 (1976)(Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the case turns largely on the "conceptual framework chosen to iden-
tify and describe the operation features" of the governmental action under review); C.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 101-106 (1979); Cover, The Uses
of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 639, 662-63 (1981).
58. This also leads to the negative/positive rights analysis in Appleton, supra note
40, at 734-737.
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fering perceptions are outcome-determinative and reflect legiti-
mate substantive disagreement over controversial constitutional
interpretation.
This difference in perception separates the majority from
the dissenters in Harris v. McRae, and the state court majorities
from the Supreme Court majority. One could thus conclude that
the state courts simply "disagree" with the United States Su-
preme Court's perception of the constitutional controversy.59
The state court could then justify this disagreement in various
ways. Our system of federalism has always contemplated such
disagreement, but state courts now face mounting criticism for
reaching "result-oriented" decisions.6 0 Without more of a justifi-
cation, state courts may face criticism regardless of the persua-
siveness of their state constitutional analysis.
The Court's majority opinion in Harris has furnished the
issues and approaches to arguments pursued by advocates before
state courts. Specific aspects of the state's constitutional text or
jurisprudence are often urged as requiring a different result on
each issue. For example, the "health-penalty" argument (protec-.
tion of potential life at the expense of woman's health) rejected
in Harris v. McRae61 produced a special emphasis on health ar-
59. There should be nothing inherently wrong with such "disagreement." See Levin-
son, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123, 141 (1979):
"To reject the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court is not in the least to reject the
binding authority of the Constitution, but only to argue that the Court is to be judged by
the Constitution itself rather than the other way around." See also Developments in the
Law, supra note 2, at 1396 ("Across jurisdictions, alternative interpretations of an open-
ended right cannot be considered illegitimate .... More important, there is nothing in-
herently unprincipled in rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Court when other argu-
ments are seen to be more persuasive."); see Hancock, supra note 21, at 1126 n.138 (To
limit state court independent interpretation of state constitutions to situations in which
there is a textual difference "is to deny state courts the fundamental power to interpret
their own constitutions as they see fit.").
State court disagreement with Supreme Court reasoning and result is not new. See,
e.g., Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 711, 207 P.2d 198, 204-05
(1949); State Ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 164-65, 115 N.W.2d 761, 769-
70 (1962). In 1906 the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed:
We are fully aware that the contrary proposition has been stated by the great
majority of the courts in this country, including the Supreme Court of the
United States. The unanimity with which it is stated is perhaps only equaled
by the paucity of reasoning by which it is supported.
Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 198, 108 N.W. 627, 628 (1906)(quoted in Comment,
supra note 2, at 488).
60. See supra note 16-20 and accompanying text.
61. 448 U.S. at 316-17; Appleton, supra note 40, at 731-37. Denial of or delay in
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guments in the New Jersey case.6 2 Similarly, the Supreme Court
in Harris, although recognizing a woman's privacy interest in
choosing an abortion, held that failure to fund an abortion did
not infringe upon a woman's privacy right." The California Su-
preme Court, by contrast, emphasized the California Constitu-
tion's special focus on privacy rights in striking down that
state's abortion funding restriction. 4
A substantial textual difference between the federal and
state constitution is the most persuasive reason for a state court
to reject a United States Supreme Court decision. 5 Thus, advo-
cates and state judges have searched state constitutions for tex-
tual support to justify decisions which decline to follow Harris.
Arguably, state constitutions containing equal rights
amendments6 provide powerful ammunition for challenges to
abortion funding restrictions. State medical assistance programs
provide coverage for virtually all medically necessary services re-
lated to reproduction for males, with restrictions on financing
for medically necessary abortions applying only to females. Al-
though the argument has been raised in several cases, no court
has yet reached it. In striking down the funding restriction as a
due process violation, the Massachusetts and Connecticut courts
reached neither the equal protection nor equal rights amend-
obtaining an abortion can cause substantial health risks. See generally Cates, Kimball
and Gold, The Health Impact of Restricting Public Funds for Abortion, 69 J. PuB. H.
945 (1979); Pettiti and Cates, Restricting Medicaid Funds for Abortions: Projections of
Excess Mortality for Women of Childbearing Age, 67 AM. J. PuB. H. 860 (1977); Roemer,
Equity in Abortion Services, 68 Am. J. Pun. H. 629 (1978).
62. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 304, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (1982)("Although
we decline to proceed as far as the Chancery Division in declaring that the New Jersey
Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to health.., we recognize that New Jersey
accords a high priority to the preservation of health."). See also id. at 307, 450 A.2d at
935; Doe v. Maher, slip op. at 58-59 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1981).
63. 448 U.S. at 312-318.
64. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 262-63, 625
P.2d 779, 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1981).
65. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 934 (1976).
66. As to state Equal Rights Amendments, see Driscoll and Rouse, Through a Glass
Darkly: A Look at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1282 (1977);
Note, One Small Word: Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 948 (1978); Comment, The Maryland Equal Rights Amendment: Eight Years
of Application, 9 U. BALT. L. RE V. 342 (1980); Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The
Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALnw. L. REv. 1086 (1977).
1984]
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ment arguments.67 The Pennsylvania court, while preliminarily
enjoining the funding restrictions, commented on the absence of
a state equal rights amendment claim, 8 and the petitioners have
filed an amended petition asserting such a claim.
Many state constitutions contain provisions concerning
"equal rights"69 which differ substantially from the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. For example, article I, sec-
tion 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "Neither the
Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny
to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate
against any person in the exercise of any civil right." This is a
modern provision which was adopted in 1967. Ten states have
similar provisions70 which go far beyond fourteenth amendment
notions of "equal protection of the laws." Advocates before the
Pennsylvania courts have argued that this provision, prohibiting
discrimination against persons in the exercise of their civil
rights, is in effect a codification of the "unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine."7 1 Although the United States Supreme Court
did not view the abortion funding restriction as an unconstitu-
tional condition, or an attempt to "achieve with carrots what
. . . is forbidden to achieve with sticks, ' 2 several state courts
have emphasized the requirement of "neutrality" in government
programs. 3 Article I, section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion provides extra support for the neutrality mandate in benefit
programs such as Medicaid.
Another example of a state constitutional equality provision
is article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution: "No law shall
be passed granting to any citizens or class of citizens privileges
or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally be-
67. Doe v. Maher, slip. op. 1, 30 n.15 (Comm. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1981); Moe v. Secre-
tary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 646, 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (1981).
68. Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 66 Pa. Commw. 70, 75 n.3, 444 A.2d 774,
777 n.3 (1982). The trial court's permanent injunction does rely on the Pennsylvania
equal rights amendment.
69. For a partial listing, see Sachs, Fundamental Liberties and Rights: A 50-State
Index, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE 7, 41 (1980).
70. See, e.g., MAINE CONsT. art. I, § 6A.
71. Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union at 11-22, Fischer v. De-
partment of Pub. Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982).
72. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10 at 933 n.77 (1978).
73. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 973; Maher, slip op.
at 48; Moe, 382 Mass. at 654, 417 N.E.2d 401-02.
[Vol. 35
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long to all citizens." The Oregon Supreme Court has referred to
this clause as the "antithesis" of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. 4 This clause prohibits the state from
enlarging the rights of a select class of citizens, as opposed to
curtailing the rights of other citizens.7 5 This clause is present in
several state constitutions and dates from an earlier period than
the fourteenth amendment. 7  Thus, a medical assistance pro-
gram granting complete medical service relating to reproduction
for males but prohibiting the use of its funds for abortions could
be viewed as discrimination in favor of men, as in the Oregon
case.
77
A difference in the technique of analysis for resolving the
constitutional issue is another approach state courts have used
in rejecting Harris.7 1 For example, after the Supreme Court re-
jected the unconstitutional conditions argument in Harris,7 9 the
California Supreme Court relied upon its own test for evaluat-
ing government benefit programs."' Also, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court specifically rejected the Supreme Court's "two-
tiered"8 2 equal protection analysis and applied its own balancing
approach."s
74. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. 294 Or. 33, 42, 653 P.2d 970, 975
(1982); Linde, Without "Due Process," supra note 55, at 141.
75. Hewitt, 294 Or. at 42, 653 P.2d at 975; Linde, Without "Due Process," supra
note 55, at 141.
76. See State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 236, 630 P.2d 810, 814 (1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1084 (1981); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 294 Or. 33, 42, 653 P.2d 970,
975 (1982).
77. Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Department of Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41,
-, 663 P.2d 1247, 1257-59 (1983).
78. See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 187. See also City of Mesquite v. Alad-
din's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982): "[A] state court is entirely free to read its
own constitution more broadly than this Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to re-
ject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a different analysis of its corre-
sponding constitutional guarantee." (emphasis supplied). Hancock, supra note 21, at
1122-23 (1982): "As arbiters of their own constitutions, state courts have the power, not
only to mandate higher standards, but also to create the theory, analysis and reasoning
that go into producing those higher standards." As to federal analysis, see Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. Rav.
1212, 1214-20 (1978)(discussing "federal judicial constructs").
79. 448 U.S. at 311 n.19.
80. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257-258, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
81. Id. at 262-286, 625 P.2d at 784-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-886.
82. 448 U.S. at 321-23. See also id. at 341-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
"two-tiered" approach).
83. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 309-10, 450 A.2d at 936-37. See also Moe, 382 Mass. at 655-58,
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Harriss4 gave little con-
sideration to the argument that the Medicaid funding restriction
was intended to interfere with poor women's freedom of choice.85
In fact, funding restrictions are but one of a wide range of legis-
lative components of "collateral deterrance" advocated by abor-
tion opponents.86 In the Pennsylvania Legislature, for example,
a funding restriction proponent made the following statement:
First of all I do not think there is any question as to what the
intent of the amendment is. We all feel that if this amendment
is adopted, we are going to prevent in the Commonwealth ap-
proximately 10,000 abortions from taking place in the next
fiscal year. This is clearly all of our intents.87
417 N.E.2d at 402-03 (interest balancing in due process analysis).
84. 448 U.S. at 315-18, 324-26. As might be expected, the dissenters emphasized this
point. See id. at 330 n.4, 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 338 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
85. This is Perry's main criticism. See Perry, supra note 42.
86. "Collateral deterrence" consists of "indirect means of noncompliance with a ju-
dicial ruling." Blake, The Supreme Court's Abortion Decisions and Public Opinion in
the United States, 3 POPULATION & DEVEL. REV. 45 n.1 (1977). For a description of "col-
lateral deterrence" in reaction to Roe v. Wade, see Johnson and Bond, Coercive and
Noncoercive Abortion Deterrence Policies: A Comparative State Analysis, 2 LAW &
POL'Y Q. 106, 114 (1980):
State use of coercion to deter abortion has concentrated on rising the costs of
having or providing abortions. The costs could be economic or psychological.
State laws that could function to increase the economic costs of abortion in-
clude facility requirements, consultations by more than one doctor, residence
requirements, and limits on the use of public funds for abortions.
87. Pa. Leg. J., House, September 24, 1980, at 2244-45 (Remarks of Rep. Mullen).
The act, as passed, declared that "it is the public policy of the Commonwealth to favor
childbirth over abortion." Act of December 19, 1980, P.L. 239, as amended 62 PA. STAT.
§ 453 (Supp. 1981-82).
For a description of the political efforts to secure earlier funding restrictions in
Pennsylvania, see Margolis, Pressure Politics Revisited: The Anti-Abortion Campaign, 8
POL'Y STUD.J. 698, 703-07 (1980). See also Palley, supra note 23.
Of course, poor women possess little political power to protect their right to choose
abortion from attempts by the legislature to interfere with that choice. As Dr. Richard
Kaufman observed:
The surrender, compromise or conquest in the politics of abortion has been the
accessibility of abortion services for the poor. Although poor women arguably
have a greater need than nonpoor women for abortions, as an interest group in
their own behalf, they lack sufficient resources and power to defend themselves
against elitist and pluralistic decisionmaking that clearly is not in their best
interest.
Kaufman, supra note 23, at 387. See also id. at 392 (asserting that rights of poor women
were sacrificed to protect abortion rights of nonpoor women); Davidson, supra note 32,
at 38. Kaufman was relying on Earl Latham's observation that "The legislature referees
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Several state courts facing the funding issue have given weight
to the argument that such restrictions constitute an intentional
infringement on poor women's rights to choose abortion."8
State courts have put forth other justifications for rejecting
Harris and striking down abortion funding restrictions. Several
courts have relied upon scholarly criticisms of HarrisRa Interest-
ingly, state courts rejecting Harris give rather short shrift to
"horizontal federalism,"90 or supporting sister state decisions re-
the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records the
terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes." Latham,
The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 376, 390 (1952),
reprinted in H: EULAN, S. ELDERSUELD & M. JANowrrz, POLrrICAL BEHAVIOR: A READER
IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 232, 239 (1956).
Kaufman's observation resembles Justice Stone's famous observation in footnote 4
of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and could generate
a powerful argument supporting state court judicial intervention. See generally Bennett,
supra note 42; Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982); Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Ander-
son, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1262, 1265, 1268 (1972); Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at
1488. See also Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 281-
82, 625 P.2d 779, 796-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 883-84 (1981).
Some Supreme Court decisions can be viewed as compromises, not among members
of the Court, but as to the reach of federal constitutional doctrine. In fact, some have
characterized the Supreme Court's abortion funding decisions this way. Lawrence Fried-
man observed:
The funding cases are best understood as a kind of compromise. They may not
be good compromise or fair compromise (women with money can do as they
wish; the poor are out of luck); but they are compromise all the same. The
Court is, no doubt, shocked by the passions let loose by Roe v. Wade. But the
justices believe in that decision and see no reason to turn back. As they ride
out the storm of public opinion, they look on the funding cases as ballast to be
thrown overboard. Whether the storm gods will be satisfied with these actions
remains to be seen.
Friedman, supra note 37, at 26. Of course, Supreme Court decisions expanding constitu-
tional rights also involve compromise. See Blasi, A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48
TEx. L. REV. 608, 613 (1970). If this is true, there is no necessary reason for state su-
preme courts, which did not decide Roe v. Wade, to engage in such compromise.
88. Moe, 382 Mass. at 654-55, 417 N.E.2d at 402 (citing Perry, supra note 42); Cf.
Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 276, 283, 625 P.2d at 790, 793, 797-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877,
880, 884-85; Maher, slip op. at 53. The argument has been made in Pennsylvania, but
neither court has yet addressed it.
89. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 267 n.17, 294 n.9, 625 P.2d at 787 n.17, 805 n.9, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 874 n.17, 892 n.9 (Byrd, C.J., concurring); Maher, slip op. at 50.
One might refer to these state courts as in Professor Sanford Levinson's term, "prot-
estants": "Instead of taking down the relevant volume of the United States Reports and
pointing to the dispositive decision, the lawyer might wish to note that some commenta-
tors criticize the decision as a 'mistake.'" Levinson, supra note 59, at 143.
90. This is a term from M. PORTER & G. TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAK-
ERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xxi-xxii (1982). See also Collins, Reliance on State Constitu-
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jecting the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the abor-
tion funding issue. The cases are noted, but almost as a passing
reference.91 The major focal point is the Supreme Court decision
itself.
B. The Influence of the Supreme Court Dissents
The only purpose which an elaborate dissent can accomplish,
if any, is to weaken the effect of the majority, and thus engen-
der want of confidence in the conclusions of courts of last
resort.
Justice Byron R. White
9 2
United States Supreme Court
A Supreme Court decision interpreting a federal constitu-
tional provision often establishes the framework for later state
court interpretations of similar or identical state constitutional
provisions. But because the Supreme Court's decision is not
binding, its persuasiveness becomes very important. Under these
circumstances, the Supreme Court's dissenting opinions perform
a function not clearly described before.
9 3
Supreme Court dissenting opinions serve several functions.
tions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTnNGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1981).
The precedential value of the state court cases, still unanamous in their rejection of Har-
ris v. McRae, should be very powerful. Robert Cover stated: "If a large number of juris-
dictions arrive independently at the conclusion that a certain kind of conduct is wrong
or detrimental, then the conclusion is more apt to reflect the problematic character of
the conduct than the problematic character of the norm articulation process." Cover,
supra note 57, at 675 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
Justice Linde observed: "Diversity is the price of a decentralized legal system, or its
justification, and guidance on common issues may be found in the decisions of other
state courts as well as in those of the United States Supreme Court." State v. Kennedy,
295 Or. 260, -, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (1983). See also Wechsler, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954)("Federalism was the means
and price of the formation of the Union.").
91. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 285, 625 P.2d at 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886; Maher, slip op.
at 55-57 ("No state that has an opportunity to rule on the issue, has followed McRae");
Byrne, 91 N.J. at 310 n.8, 450 A.2d at 937 n.8; Moe, 382 Mass. at , 417 N.E.2d at 396-
97.
92. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895)(White, J.,
dissenting).
93. Williams, supra note 2, at 189-90. Reliance on dissenting opinions was also de-
scribed in Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1385, 1389.
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First, dissenting opinions influence the Court's majority opin-
ion.94 For example, dissents reduce the majority opinion's per-
suasiveness by depriving it of unanimity.95 This alone is ground
for criticizing the majority opinion.96 Dissenting opinions also
ensure that the majority opinion fully considers the issues
presented in the case,9' and they reveal the divisions within the
Court over difficult and controversial issues.98
A dissenting opinion's most widely acknowledged function,
however, is to influence the Court's future decisions-the dis-
senter's ultimate vindication. Justice Cardozo said, "The dis-
senter speaks of the future, and his voice is pitched to a key that
will carry through the years." '9 Similarly, Chief Justice Hughes
observed: "-A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day,
when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which
the dissenting judge believes the court to have been be-
trayed."100 Yet future vindication of a dissenting Justice's posi-
tion is fairly rare. One study has indicated that Justice Holmes
was vindicated on less than ten percent of his dissents.10 1
It is now becoming clear that Supreme Court dissenting
opinions may influence the legislative branch 1°2 or state courts
as well as current or future Court majorities. That is, Supreme
94. See generally P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT (1969); Moorehead,
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 A.B.A.J. 821 (1952); ZoBell, Division of Opin-
ion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORN. L.Q. 186
(1959).
95. For example, all of the state courts have noted that Harris v. McRae was a 5-4
decision. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 260, 625 P.2d at 781, 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868, 870;
Maher, slip op. at 49 (Harris described as a "bare bone majority" and a "slim majority");
Moe, 382 Mass. at 650, 417 N.E.2d at 399-400; Byrne 91 N.J. at 301, 450 A.2d at 932.
96. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802, 804 (1982).
But see Rehnquist, "All Discord, Harmony Not Understood": The Performance of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 22 ARIz. L. Rv. 973 (1980).
97. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 923, 927 (1962).
98. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case
Presentation, 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 863 (1951).
99. B. CARnozo, LAw AND LrrERATuRE 36 (1931)(quoted in P. JACKSON, supra note
94, at 17).
100. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF TIE UNrrD STATES 68 (1928) (quoted in P.
JACKSON, supra, note 94, at 17).
101. ZoBell, supra note 94, at 211. See also Schaefer, Chief Justice Traynor and the
Judicial Process, 53 CAL. L. REv. 11, 22-23 (1965)(tracing the vindication of some of
Justice Traynor's dissenting positions).
102. Fuld, supra note 97, at 927; Schaefer, supra note 101, at 23.
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Court dissents can and do have a significant impact upon state
courts confronting the same constitutional problem the dissenter
believes the Court decided incorrectly. In this sense, state courts
have become a new audience for Supreme Court dissents on fed-
eral constitutional questions that may also arise under state con-
stitutions. 0 3 Thus, dissenters may be vindicated more quickly,
but only on a state-by-state basis. One might ask, then, whether
Justice Brennan's and Marshall's dissents, among others, have
not enjoyed a much higher vindication rate in state cases than
Holmes ever achieved in later Supreme Court decisions.
Although not true in the Harris v. McRae example, some
Supreme Court dissenters 0 4  have specifically invited state
courts to consider rejecting the Court's reasoning and result.
10 5
Justice Brennan has made this general recommendation in a
now famous article.106 It is important to note, however, that Su-
preme Court statements that state courts may interpret their
constitutions more expansively than the federal constitution are
not the source of that state power. Rather, these statements
merely recognize such state authority in the absence of counter-
vailing federal rights.
10 7
103. Chief Justice Hughes once observed: "The state court may be persuaded by
majority opinions in this Court or it may prefer the reasoning of dissenting judges ......
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 558 (1940). In 1962, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761
(1962), relied upon a Supreme Court dissent in rejecting the Court's majority approach.
104. Even Supreme Court majority opinions sometimes suggest this. See, e.g., Jen-
kins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975);
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
105. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 396 (1976)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Paul Bator has criticized this practice: "I regard it as inappropriate for Supreme Court
Justices themselves to campaign to enact into unreviewable state constitutional law dis-
senting views about federal constitutional law which have been duly rejected by the
United States Supreme Court." Bator, supra note 19, at 605 n.1.
106. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. Rsv. 489 (1977). For other statements by Justice Brennan on this theme, see
Collins, supra note 90, at 1-2. See generally Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary ly
United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lock-
jaw, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 633 (1962).
The Connecticut Superior Court decision rejecting Harris quotes from the Brennan
article. Maher, slip op. at 52-52. See also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 300, 450
A.2d 925, 931 (1982).
107. Thus, state courts need not cite the Supreme Court as authority for state
courts to interpret their constitutions more broadly than the Supreme Court interprets
the federal provisions. See also State v. Benoit, - R.I...., ._, 417 A.2d 895, 899
24
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The state abortion financing decisions rejecting Harris v.
McRae neatly illustrate many of these points. The majority
opinions 108 all rely to a certain extent explicitly, and to a greater
extent implicitly, on the reasoning and result of dissenting Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in Harris.0 9
C. Abortion Financing Decisions-Reactive or Independent
Interpretation
As the ongoing process of constitutional decisionmaking
continues through the "second looks" of state constitutional in-
terpretation, commentators attempt to categorize state judicial
decisions rejecting United States Supreme Court reasoning and
result. These commentators often pay little attention to state
cases "following" the Supreme Court's lead. But, where state
courts diverge, commentators contrast a "reactive" 110 or "reac-
tionary""' approach with a "self-reliant" 1" 2 or "independent"" 3
approach.
The reactive court focuses its attention on federal prece-
dent, often a recent Supreme Court case denying federal pro-
tection in an analogous situation, and arrives at its result by
responding to the federal reasoning, often by attacking it fron-
tally or by articulating state-specific or institutional reasons for
divergence from the federal result.
The self-reliant approach, on the other hand, focuses on
the state constitution as an independent source of rights to be
elaborated on its own terms. Courts using this approach ex-
amine the full panoply of considerations.appropriate to judicial
interpretation of fundamental law.
114
Several commentators have, not surprisingly, characterized
(1980).
108. Predictably, the state court dissenting opinions rely on the Supreme Court's
majority opinion in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
109. See, e.g. Maher, slip op. at 50, 55, 58, 64; Moe, 382 Mass. at 653, 655, 417
N.E.2d at 401, 402; Byrne, 91 N.J. at 302-03, 306.
110. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1358, 1362, 1494. See also Note,
supra note 16, at 305-06 ("Supreme Court oriented" interpretation).
111. Collins, supra note 90, at 2.
112. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1358, 1362, 1364, 1495. See also
Note, supra note 16, at 305-06 ("pure" state constitutional interpretation).
113. Collins, supra note 90, at 3, 5.
114. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1363-64 (footnotes omitted).
1984]
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state decisions rejecting Harris v. McRae as reactive, using the
term in a generally perjorative sense.115 Under the circum-
stances, though, with a highly visible and controversial 5-4 Su-
preme Court decision casting its shadow over the state court
proceedings, it seems hardly possible that these state courts
could have performed "zero-based state interpretation. 1 11 After
all, a one-vote difference of the Supreme Court would have ren-
dered unnecessary the state court's need to examine the issue.
What would be said about a state court decision that did not
even cite a Supreme Court decision on point?
One could argue that state courts are merely reacting to the
unfairness of legislative interference with poor women's right to
choose abortion, rather than to a Supreme Court decision.
Under this view, these state decisions are consistent with basic
constitutional notions of equality and fairness. Alternatively,
state courts may view abortion funding restrictions as a response
to a vocal single-issue minority and not as an accurate reflection
of majority sentiment. Thus, the abortion funding cases could
reflect state court protection of majority rights. 11 7 Still, the state
courts would be in substantive disagreement with the United
States Supreme Court's conclusion. 1 8 Although these state
courts would likely have reached the same conclusion in the ab-
sence of a Supreme Court decision, they cannot control the liti-
gation strategy often pursued by civil rights advocates: litigate
federal constitutional claims-aiming for a nationwide deci-
sion-prior to litigating state constitutional claims in smaller,
state "universes." 19 Further, state courts have little control over
the agenda-setting impact of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions and the way such decisions influence preparation of state
constitutional cases by counsel.
115. Collins, supra note 90, at 18 n.63; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at
1364 n.156.
116. Kelman, supra note 55, at 429. See also Developments in the Law, supra note
2, at 1419: "Commentators who condemn state judiciaries for referring to federal doc-
trine when interpreting their own charters would force an irrational chauvinism on the
state courts." (footnote omitted).
117. See supra notes 86, 87; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1498-1502.
118. See supra note 59.
119. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35
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D. Legislative Reaction
In Harris v. McRae and its companion case, 120 the Supreme
Court held that statutes restricting the use of Medicaid funds
for abortion did not violate poor women's federal constitutional
rights.121 States were not required to restrict funding,122 how-
ever, and remained free to provide state dollars for such cover-
age.123 In fact, a number of states legislatively maintained pro-
choice policies 124 in their Medicaid programs after the Supreme
Court upheld state statutes restricting state-funded abortions in
1977125 and after Congress enacted the Hyde Amendment.
At least nine states and the District of Columbia have legis-
latively decided to expend state funds for abortions for poor
women since the Supreme Court's decision in Harris.126 These
states have initiated this policy even though as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional and statutory law they are not required to do
SO.127 These legislative decisions may be viewed as legislative
"constitutional" decisions, based upon notions of fairness to
poor women. 128 The executive branch, through the governor's
power to propose budget items and utilize the veto power, influ-
ences these legislative decisions in many important, though not
120. 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
121. 448 U.S. at 322.
122. In Harris the Court observed: "A participating State is free, if it so chooses, to
include in its Medicaid plan those medically necessary abortions for which federal reim-
bursement is unavailable. . . . We hold only that a State need not include such abor-
tions in its Medicaid plan." 448 U.S. at 311 n.16 (emphasis in original). See also Wil-
liams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 367 n.9 (1980).
123. The Hyde Amendment merely prohibited the use of federal funds for abortion.
The argument that states were therefore required to fund abortions from state funds was
rejected in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308-11 (1980). There was no implication, how-
ever, that states could not choose to expend their own funds for this purpose.
124. "[B]y, in effect, placing part of the burden of decisionmaking on the states, the
court has ... significantly broadened the scope of state action." Nicholson and Stewart,
Preliminary Analysis, supra note 23, at 159. See also Stewart and Nicholson, Follow-Up
Analysis, supra note 23.
125. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
126. Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Or-
egon and Washington. Brozan, supra note 30.
127. See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 192-93; Tarr and Porter, Gender
Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate Courts, 9 HAsnNGs
CONST. L.Q. 919 (1982).
128. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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always obvious, ways.12
On purely fiscal grounds, providing Medicaid funds for
abortion is much less expensive than prohibiting the use of such
funds for abortion.13 0 A study commissioned by a Florida legisla-
tive committee in 1978 estimated that over a thirty-year period
the cost to the state of providing Medicaid abortions would be
between 8.5 and 9.7 million dollars, while the medical, social ser-
vice and other costs associated with the births of unwanted chil-
dren to Medicaid-eligible women who would otherwise have
abortions was between 834 million and 3.4 billion dollars.131 But
fiscal arguments are not always persuasive in a legislative debate
over Medicaid funding for abortion, and Florida declined to pro-
vide state abortion funding.
State legislative decisions providing Medicaid funding for
abortion do not involve the legitimacy questions raised by state
court decisions "evading" Harris v. McRae. The issue is addres-
sed simply as a legislative policy choice, albeit a controversial
one. The question of state funding for abortion appears likely to
remain on state legislative agendas for the forseeable future,132
although in states legislatively providing full state funding, a
second judicial look at the question through state constitutional
litigation obviously will not be necessary. 3
129. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 911, 370 N.E.2d 1350 (1977)(up-
holding gubernatorial veto of appropriation rider limiting abortion funding).
130. One commentator has described the Hyde Amendment as a "spendthrift mea-
sure." Perry, supra note 42, at 1124. Justice Stevens made this observation in Harris.
448 U.S. 297, 355-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Several state courts which rejected Harris have observed that this fiscal argument
undercuts any state interest in preserving funds by terminating abortion funding. See
Moo v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 656 n.20, 417 N.E.2d 387, 403 n.20
(1981); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 277, 625 P.2d
779, 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 881 (1981).
131. H. GiTLow, BANNG VESus NOT BANNING MEDICAID FUNDS FOR ABORTIONS IN
FLORIDA: A TrnwTY-YEAN PROJECTION OF CosTs 7 (April 1978). See also Kaufman, supra
note 23, at 391.
132. A description of the political forces on both sides of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Kaufman, supra note 23; Margolis, supra note 86;
Palley, supra note 23.
133. But see Star v. State, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981).
380 [Vol. 35
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E. The Constitutional Decisionmaking Process Continues:
State Constitutional Amendment
Where resort to the state constitution is a selective, issue-by-
issue process, it will come as little surprise when the public
manifests its outrage, backed by its amendment muscle, at
novel state constitutional decisions.
134
A state court decision interpreting the state constitution is
insulated from vertical, federal judicial review.135 Such a deci-
sion is not, however, insulated from horizontal, political review
via a proposed state constitutional amendment. 136 This form of
constitutional "backlash, 1 3 7 unlikely in the federal system, 38
seems a possibility when controversial questions such as abor-
tion are involved.13 9 In fact, the process has already begun in
Massachusetts in response to that state's abortion financing de-
cision. 140 Of course, if such an amendment were adopted, its
adoption procedure faces a likely challenge.14 1 Nevertheless, one
cannot help but wonder whether such an overruling amendment
might inhibit other state courts from invalidating abortion fund-
ing restrictions. 42
134. Collins, supra note 87, at 17-18 (footnote omitted). Collins uses the Massachu-
setts abortion funding case, Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417
N.E.2d 387 (1981), as an example of a decision which might generate a reactive state
constitutional amendment. Collins, supra note 90, at 18 n.63.
135. But see Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), supra note 13.
136. On January 4, 1983, the Massachusetts Legislature approved the following con-
stitutional amendment: "The General Court may regulate or prohibit abortion and may
regulate or prohibit private or public funding for abortion or the provision of services or
facilities therefore." Journal of the Massachusetts Senate, p. 1408. The amendment will
be placed on the ballot if the Legislature approves it once more.
137. Williams, supra note 2, at 192 n.100.
138. But see Linde, supra note 22, at 235 (describing the twenty-sixth amendment,
concerning 18-year-old voting, in response to Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970):
"The real constitutional decision was made ultimately by the Twenty-Sixth
amendment.").
139. Williams, supra note 2, at 176: "Recent events indicate ... that proposed
amendments to state constitutions sometimes provide a forum for resolving major socie-
tal conflicts."
140. See supra note 136.
141. See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 224-27.
142. See supra note 14. See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 192 n.100; Collins,
supra note 106, at 17 n.62; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1351 n.91. Justice
Handler noted that state constitutional amendments might override judicial interpreta-
tions of the state constitution in State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 287, 338 n.1, 450 A.2d 925, 964
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One could argue that because state constitutions are rela-
tively easy to amend, thereby correcting "mistakes," state courts
should be willing to render more expansive or controversial state
constitutional interpretations. 1 3 Amendments to state constitu-
tions overruling judicial interpretations are nothing new.14 4 One
of the most famous examples is the New York constitutional
amendment overruling, almost immediately, the New York
Court of Appeals' 1911 decision declaring workmen's compensa-
tion unconstitutional.1 45 Such constitutional amendments, "cor-
recting" judicial interpretations of state constitutions regarding
governmental power and structure, have been common.
Constitutional amendments overturning judicial interpreta-
tions of state Declarations of Rights, however, are relatively
new.146 These amendments usually arise in emotional contexts,
often in response to a decision concerning the rights of minori-
ties, the powerless, or other unpopular people.1 47 The political
discourse surrounding such amendments usually portrays the
motivating judicial decision as illegitimate. Hence, some might
view an amendment's adoption under these circumstances as a
popular rebuff to undemocratic judicial activism.
This possibility of popular rebuff to state court action has
n.1 (1982).
143. Compare Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 275, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694
(1975); and Howard, supra note 65, at 939, with Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1102
(Me. 1983); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 115-26, 405 A.2d 368, 375-81 (1979)(Mountain, J.,
dissenting); Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 FIA.
ST. U.L. REV. 567, 568 (1978); and Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1500 n.21.
144. Williams, supra note 2, at 178 n.36.
145. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911)(state and federal
due process). For the Court of Appeals' views after the amendment, see Jensen v. South-
ern Pac. Ry., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1914)(federal due process).
146. See generally Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democ-
racy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HAST. CONsT. L.Q. - (1984). See also
M. PORTER & G. TARR, supra note 90, at xii ("Only rarely, as when California voters
amended their constituion to legitimize the judicially invalidated death penalty, is ac-
tivist policymaking challenged."); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts, supra note 2, at
791-92; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1354. But see the 1936 amendment to
the Michigan Constitution which overruled a line of cases culminating in People v. Stein,
265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933) (discussed in People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 259,
97 N.W.2d 16, 22 (1959)); Kelman, supra note 55, at 432 n.84.
147. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1982) (search and seizure interpretation
must follow federal interpretation); MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26 (1780, amended
1982)(death penalty not cruel and unusual punishment); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (same);
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1974 amended 1979)(busing decisions must not go beyond federal
mandate).
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encouraged the trend anong state courts and commentators to
formulate criteria to justify state court rejection of Supreme
Court decisions. Adequate justification for state constitutional
decisions is seen as a way to diffuse such adverse voter reactions.
Yet, constitutional amendments overriding civil liberties deci-
sions are usually based upon popular disagreement with the de-
cision's substantive outcome, not the court's reasoning process.
Thus, in the political debate surrounding the proposed amend-
ment, the state court's justification for its decision as resting, for
example, upon textual differences between the state and federal
constitution may be of no consequence.
The most dramatic event in the "overruling" amendment
controversy has been Chief Justice Burger's recent comments in
Florida v. Casal.148 There, he lauded the Florida constitutional
amendment overruling judicial interpretation of the state's
search and seizure protections. This amendment, a meat-axe ap-
proach to overruling judicial decisions, linked all future interpre-
tations (under all circumstances, not just those in the case over-
ruled) to Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth
amendment.
149
In Casal, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted because the Florida decision was based
upon an adequate and independent state ground. Chief Justice
Burger concurred, noting:
I question that anything in the language of either the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Art.
I, [section] 12 of the Florida Constitution required suppression
of the drugs as evidence. However, the Florida Supreme Court
apparently concluded that state law required suppression of
the evidence, independent of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
The people of Florida have since shown acute awareness of
the means to prevent such inconsistent interpretations of the
two constitutional provisions.
148. 103 S. Ct. 3100, 3101 (1983)(Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Colorado v. Nu-
nez, 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984), where Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor
concurred in the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. They agreed
that the Colorado court's judgment rested on adequate and independent state grounds,
but pointed out the case would have been resolved differently under federal law.
149. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1982). See infra note 252.
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With our dual system of state and federal laws, adminis-
tered by parallel state and federal courts, different standards
may arise in various areas. But when state courts interpret
state law to require more than the Federal Constitution re-
quires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have
the power to amend state law to ensure rational law
enforcement.8 0
The Chief Justice's comments represent a profound depar-
ture from the spirit of many expressions, by Justices of different
persuasions, that state courts are free to interpret their constitu-
tions more broadly than the Supreme Court interprets the fed-
eral constitution."' Chief Justice Burger's surprising advice to
state electorates seems to reflect his belief that Supreme Court
decisions enjoy presumptive validity as guides for state court in-
terpretations of similar or identical state constitutional
provisions.
150. 103 S. Ct. 3100, 3101-02 (1983)(Burger, C.J., concurring)(emphasis in original).
This statement calls to mind Paul Bator's criticism of justices campaigning for the enact-
ment of unreviewable state constitutional law. See supra note 19.
151. Compare expressions noted in supra note 105 with Bustop Inc. v. Los Angeles
Bd. of Ed., 439 U.S. 1380, 1382 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., opinion in chambers): "So far as
this Court is concerned they [state courts] are free to interpret the Constitution of the
State to impose more stringent restrictions. . . ." See also Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for the Court in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 47, 81 (1980)(state's
"sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution"); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 440 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Burger, To Weaken Our State Courts Is
To Destroy Federalism, 17 JUDoES' J. 11, 12 (No. 2, 1978).
[Vol. 35
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III. LEGITIMACY OF STATE JuDIcIAL DISAGREEMENT WITH THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
[U]nmistakeably, a high state court judge and a United
States Supreme Court Justice must often look at the same
case with different eyeglasses.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
852
United States Supreme Court
A. Criteria for Disagreement with the United States
Supreme Court
The development of criteria to justify a state court decision
rejecting a Supreme Court interpretation of a similar or identi-
cal federal constitutional question can, in the long run, impede
independent state constitutional interpretation. Such unforseen
impairment is well illustrated by Right to Choose v. Byrne,153
the New Jersey abortion funding decision. It is important to fo-
cus on the divergence of opinion and methodology in Byrne be-
cause New Jersey is often cited as a leader in state constitu-
tional interpretation.'"
Each state court rejecting Harris v. McRae has stressed
state courts' prior record of interpreting their constitutions to
provide "more" rights than the federal constitution.155 After
making this general point, each state court then lists previous
cases where it has gone beyond Supreme Court decisions." 6
152. Brennan, State Supreme Court Judge Versus United States Supreme Court
Justice: A Change in Function and Perspective, 19 U. FIA. L. REv. 225, 227 (1966). See
also Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 949 (1964), where
Justice Brennan posits that the roles of state supreme court justices and United States
Supreme Court Justices, even in the same case, are functionally different.
153. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
154. See Cohn, Justice Pashman As Federalist: The New Jersey Constitution Un-
bound, 35 RUTG s L. Rav. 213, 216 n.22 (1983), and authorities cited therein. See also
Mosk, Justice Pashman, 14 RUTGES L.J. iv (1982).
155. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252,
261 n.4, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84 n.4, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870 n.4 (1981); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 300-301, 450 A.2d 925, 932 (1982).
156. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261 n.4, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84 n.4, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870
n.4 (1981); Doe v. Maher, slip op. at 52-53; Moe, 382 Mass. at 651, 417 N.E.2d at 400;
Byrne, 91 N.J. at 300, 450 A.2d at 931-32.
Interestingly, this approach encourages lawyers to cite all of that state's cases reach-
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Byrne, however, varies this approach somewhat. In Byrne, Jus-
tice Pollock first noted the advisability in a federal system of
uniform interpretation of similar constitutional provisions.' He
then observed: "Where provisions of the federal and state Con-
stitutions differ, however, or where a previously established body
of state law leads to a different result, then we must determine
whether a more expansive grant of rights is mandated by our
state Constitution.
1 58
Another example of New Jersey's criteria justification is
Justice Handler's concurring opinion in State v. Hunt. 59 Cited
by Justice Pollock with approval in Byrne and rendered on the
same day, Justice Handler's Hunt opinion portrays the state
constitution as a "fall-back" source of rights to which state
courts may "resort" under certain circumstances. But the Jus-
tice cautioned:
There is a danger, however, in state courts turning uncritically
to their state constitutions for convenient solutions to
problems not readily or obviously found elsewhere. The erosion
or dilution of constitutional doctrine may be the eventual re-
sult of such an expedient approach.160
It is therefore appropriate, in my estimation, to identify
and explain standards or criteria for determining when to in-
voke our State Constitution as an independent source for pro-
ing a different result from the United States Supreme Court. Supposedly, this list of
cases lends credence to the argument that the court should not follow the Supreme
Court decision in the case at bar. A good but outdated state-by-state survey of indepen-
dent state constitutional interpretation can be found in Project Report: Toward An Ac-
tivist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HRv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 271, 322-350 (1973).
157. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 301, 450 A.2d at 932.
158. Id., 450 A.2d at 932. For a complete exposition of Justice Pollock's views on the
methodology of state constitutional interpretation, see Pollock, State Constitutions As
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RuT. L. REv. 707 (1983). See also State v.
Benoit, - R.I. -, -, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (1980).
159. 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982). In Hunt, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found a defendant's telephone toll billing records to be protected from unreasonable
search and seizure under the New Jersey Constitution, rejecting a contrary holding as to
a pen register listing of numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). One
commentator has criticized the criteria argument. Collins, supra note 90, at 17.
160. Hunt, 91 N.J. at 349, 450 A.2d at 963-64 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Han-
dler noted the possibility that state court constitutional interpretations could be over-
ruled by state constitutional amendments. Id. at 361 n.2, 450 A.2d at 964 n.2 (Handler,
J., concurring). See supra notes 14, 134-151 and accompanying text.
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tecting individual rights.'
Justice Handler listed seven criteria or standards that
would justify a result different from the Supreme Court's: (1)
textual differences in the constitutions; (2) "legislative history"
of the provision indicating a broader meaning than the federal
provision; (3) state law predating the Supreme Court decision;
(4) differences in federal and state structure; (5) subject matter
of particular state or local interest; (6) particular state history or
traditions; and (7) public attitudes in the state.162 He concluded
that reliance on such criteria demonstrates that a divergent state
constitutional interpretation "does not spring from pure intui-
tion but, rather, from a process that is reasonable and
reasoned."'
1 63
Justice Handler denied that his analysis created a presump-
tion in favor of the Supreme Court result,'" but Justice Pash-
man in a separate concurrence disagreed.6 5 Importantly, Justice
Pashman observed that such a presumption limits a state court's
authority to interpret its constitution. 66
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus appears to require
some objectively verifiable difference between state and federal
constitutional analysis-whether textual, decisional, or histori-
cal-to justify a state court's interpretational divergence. This
view implies that in the absence of one or more of the criteria
161. Hunt, 91 N.J. at 363, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J., concurring)(emphasis
added).
162. Id. at 363-368, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 367, 450 A.2d at 967 (Handler, J., concurring).
164. Id. n.3, 405 A.2d at 967 n.3 (Handler, J., concurring). In a recent article, Justice
Handler stated: "I wrote separately in Hunt to express my view that resort to the state
constitution as an independent source for protecting individual rights is most appropri-
ate when supported by sound reasons of state law, policy or tradition." Handler, Ex-
pounding the State Constitution, 35 RuTGms L. Ray. 197, 204 (1983). See also id. at 206
n.29; State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 57, 459 A.2d 641, 650 (1983)("We have not hesitated
to recognize and vindicate individual rights under the State Constitution where our own
constitutional history, legal traditions, strong public policy and special state concerns
warrant such action.").
165. Hunt, 91 N.J. at 346 n.1, 348, 450 A.2d at 960 n.1, 962 (Pashman, J., concur-
ring). See also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 332-33, 450 A.2d 925, 949
(1982)(Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. "Although the factors listed [by Justice Handler] are potentially broad, they
impose clear limits." Hunt, 91 N.J. at 354, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring).
See also State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982)(federal constitutional inter-
pretations do not limit state constitutional rights).
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identified, it is illegitimate for a state court to reject the reason-
ing or result of a Supreme Court decision.""7
Thus, the New Jersey approach treats the Supreme Court's
reasoning and result as presumptively correct 6 8 for state consti-
tutional analysis. As a result of this presumption, the state court
is compelled to explain, in terms of the identified criteria, why it
is not following the Supreme Court precedent.16 9 A constitu-
tional interpretation "that will stand the test of detached criti-
cism" 170 is not enough. Justification in this manner raises several
critical issues: (1) Is disagreement over substantive constitu-
tional interpretation illegitimate? (2) Does the persuasive power
of Supreme Court decisions depend upon the Court's institu-
tional position or the soundness of its reasoning? Since the New
Jersey view places a high value on the institutional aspect of
constitutional interpretation at the expense of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence, it is submitted that this approach
attributes too much to Supreme Court decisions.
The type of criteria, factors, and standards listed by the
New Jersey Justices and other commentators1 71 reflect circum-
stances under which state courts have interpreted their constitu-
tions to provide more extensive rights than their federal coun-
terpart. They properly serve as important guides for courts and
advocates. 7 2 But they should not serve as limitations on state
court authority to disagree with Supreme Court constitutional
167. But see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text. Justice Linde refers to the
notion of presumptive validity as a "non sequitur." State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, -,
666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (1983).
169. See Note, supra note 16, at 318: "The court must convince the legal community
and the citizenry at large that it was justified in its disagreements with the Supreme
Court and that the state constitution supports different outcomes." (footnote omitted).
170. Howard, supra, note 65, at 934. But see Linde, supra note 22, at 248 (citing the
importance of constitutional decisions even when they are vulnerable to academic
criticism).
171. See, e.g., Galie, The Other Supreme Courts, supra note 2; Howard, supra note
65, at 934-44; Williams, supra note 2, at 185-91, Developments in the Law, supra note 2,
at 1330 n.27. Several commentators have presented similar factors as "criteria." See, e.g.,
Deukmejian and Thompson, supra note 19, at 986-96; Note, supra note 16, at 318-19.
172. Justice Linde has stated that "to make an independent argument under the
state clause takes homework-in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to analysis.
It is not enough to ask the state court to reject a Supreme Court opinion on the compa-
rable federal clause merely because one prefers the opposite result." Linde, First Things
First, supra note 55, at 392.
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analysis even if none of the factors are present.
B. Supreme Court Decisions Cannot Have Presumptive
Validity for State Constitutional Interpretation
Litigants and other interest groups 17 3 often resort first to
the federal courts. They seek, ultimately, a nationally applicable
federal constitutional ruling. Of course, state courts may not dis-
regard Supreme Court decisions establishing minimum federal
constitutional protections.17 4 But Supreme Court federal consti-
tutional interpretations failing to recognize rights may be inap-
propriate guides for state constitutional interpretation. The in-
stitutional limitations inherent in Supreme Court federal
constitutional rulings upholding state policies provide state
courts with ample reasons for discounting such interpretations,
even as to identically-worded state constitutional provisions.
Further, this is true even in the absence of specific or explicit
evidence that such limitations influenced a particular Supreme
Court decision.
A United States Supreme Court decision, at least one inter-
preting the fourteenth amendment, "must operate in all areas of
the nation and hence it invariably represents the lowest common
denominator."'175  Federalism concerns 17  and the fourteenth
173. See generally Hakman, Lobbying the Supreme Court-An Appraisal of "Po-
litical Science Folklore," 35 FoRDHrm L. REV. 15 (1966); Krislov, The Amicus Curiae
Brief. From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963); O'Connor and Epstein, An
Appraisal of Hakman's "Folklore," 16 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 311 (1982).
174. But see Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 690-91, 344 A.2d 80,81 (1975)(Maryland
courts not bound by lower federal court interpretations of the federal Constitution).
175. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 242, 635
P.2d 108, 115 (1981). See also infra note 208 and accompanying text.
176. Most Supreme Court decisions involving constitutional challenges to state stat-
utes, regulations, or executive action arise under the fourteenth amendment. The body of
the federal Constitution, however, contains similar limiting provisions. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
The Supreme Court's most explicit recognition of federalism limits in fourteenth
amendment interpretation appears in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 44 (1973). See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1217-18 (1978)(referring to federalism as an "in-
stitutional" rather than an "analytical" limitation). Still, federalism concerns (not always
explicit) are present in much of the federal constitutional interpretation with respect to
states. See also id. at 1218-19:
ET]here are certainly other norms which are significantly underenforced. While
there is no litmus test for distinguishing these norms, there are indicia of un-
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amendment's state action requirement1V 7  impose well-known
limitations on Supreme Court constitutional analysis. Also, when
viewed through Supreme Court federal constitutional inter-
pretations, "states' rights" issues often portray states as fungible
political entities possessing a uniform set of rights and powers.
This, of course, is not the case.
The fourteenth amendment is "a prominent example of a
constitutional norm which is underenforced to a significant de-
gree by the federal judiciary.""' The Supreme Court's "under-
enforcement" of federal constitutional guarantees for institu-
tional rather than analytical reasons has been documented.179
Such limits on the reach of federal constitutional interpretation
have nothing to do with the substantive constitutional guarantee
of equality.180 Although the Supreme Court does not spealk of
underenforcement, in a 1973 case Justice Powell explicitly noted
the federalism limitations present in equal protection cases:
derenforcement. These include a disparity between the scope of a federal judi-
cial construct and that of plausible understandings of the constitutional con-
cept from which it derives, the presence in court opinions of frankly
institutional explanations for setting particular limits to a federal judicial con-
struct, and other anomalies....
The Supreme Court expressed no explicit federalism concerns in the abortion
financing cases. But see infra note 180 and accompanying text. In Harris, the Court
applied fifth amendment analysis in upholding a federal statute and in Williams, the
companion case, it applied the same analysis under the fourteenth amendment. See infra
note 178.
As to federalism concerns associated with applying the eighth amendment against
the states through the fourteenth amendment, see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547-48
(1968)(Black, J., concurring); Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773, 1798 (1970).
177. See Williams, supra, note 2, at 187-88. The state action requirement in federal
constitutional interpretation has been described as a "judicial balancing of competing
interests." Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 242, 630
P.2d 108, 115 (1981)(citing Glennon'and Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Four-
teenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 222, 232-36
(1976)).
178. Sager, supra note 176, at 1218. Of course, Harris was decided under the fifth
amendment, which applies directly only to the federal government and which lacks an
equal protection clause. Fourteenth amendment equal protection doctrines have become
part of the fifth amendment's due process clause by "reverse incorporation." See gener-
ally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REv. 541
(1977).
179. Sager, supra note 176, at 1218-20.
180. One commentator has characterized Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), which
was held to be controlling in Harris v. McRae, as based upon institutional constraints.
Sager, supra note 176, at 1227 n.48.
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It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under
the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relation-
ship between national and state power under our federal sys-
tem. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process
of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the
traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be sub-
jected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny.18'
The ever-present federalism concerns implicated in Su-
preme Court review of state statutes or executive actions are il-
lustrated by the Court's approach to enforcing specific Bill of
Rights' protections against state action. Originally, of course, the
Bill of Rights applied only against the federal government and
not the states.i8 2 The adoption of the fourteenth amendment in
1868, however, fundamentally altered the relationship between
the states and the federal government.
The question of whether the fourteenth amendment's due
process or privileges and immunities clauses'83 made the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states (incorporated) was essentially a
question of federalism.' 8 Interestingly, in Adamson v. Califor-
nia,'8 5 both Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion opposing
incorporation8 8 and Justice Black's dissenting opinion support-
ing incorporation 87 were based upon federalism concerns.
The Supreme Court has never adopted Justice Black's total
181. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973). See also
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 (1959)(Brennan, J., concurring):
"The maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration in inter-
preting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which the Court examines
state action."
182. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
183. Beginning with the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the
privileges and immunities approach was rejected. See generally Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 761, 767-68 (1961).
184. See generally Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
185. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
186. Id. at 59. See generally Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the
Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HRv. L.
REv. 746 (1965).
187. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68. Black viewed incorporation as a limiting doctrine,
providing objective limits rooted in the first eight amendments. To Black, the "ordered
liberty" approach contained in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), was too subjec-
tive. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70, 75, 82-83, 90-92 (Black, J., dissenting). For a similar,
more modem statement of this position, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413-14
(1965)(Goldberg, J., concurring).
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incorporation approach.1 8 Rather, the Supreme Court has used
"selective incorporation" in applying the Bill of Rights against
the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. 189
The selective incorporation approach, however, often re-
quired the Court to determine the substantive content of a Bill
of Rights' provision while simultaneously deciding whether the
substantive right applied to the states. For example, Justice
Reed's majority opinion in Adamson v. California'"0 was willing
to assume arguendo an expansive interpretation of the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination when the right
did not apply against the states."' In contrast, Justice Reed's
plurality opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,19 2 de-
cided just months before Adamson, assumed that the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
applied to the states19 3 but concluded that the death penalty
(even a second attempt after a failed electrocution) did not con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment.194
Thus, the application of Bill of Rights' protections against
the states through selective incorporation raises questions about
whether and to what extent federalism concerns have con-
188. Justice Black viewed "selective incorporation" as still better and more objective
than the Palko "natural rights" approach. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 89. See also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968)(Black, J., concurring).
189. See generally R. CORTNER, THE SuPREMiE COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF
RIGHTS (1981); Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Israel, Foreward: Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J.
253 (1982).
190. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
191. Id. at 50. See also id. at 69 (Black, J., dissenting).
192. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
193. Id. at 462. As two commentators recently noted, the holding in Francis was
predicted largely on federalism concerns. Miller and Bowman, Slow Dance on the Kill-
ing Grounds: The Willie Francis Case Revisited, 32 DE PAUL L. Ray. 1 (1983). According
to recently available correspondence, Justice Frankfurter, who cast the deciding swing
vote, stated in his private correspondence that his sole reason for voting to uphold Loui-
siana's actions was "the disciplined thinking of a lifetime regarding the duty of the Court
in putting limitations upon the power of a state ... ." Id. at 23-4.
194. Id. at 463-64. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908), the Court also
engaged in this "assumption without deciding" technique of reasoning. For a criticism of
his approach, see Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Twining, 211 U.S. at 114-116
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937)(as-
suming content of fifth amendment double jeopardy); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
277 n.13 (1980)(tracing cases assuming states could not inflict cruel and unusual
punishments).
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strained the Court's development of such constitutional protec-
tions. Could Justice Reed's assumption about the eighth amend-
ment's application to the states have caused the Court to limit
the scope of that right? Is it not possible that the content of
constitutional rights could be diluted when applied against the
states? Would the result in Francis have been the same if it in-
volved federal rather than state officials? Although the answers
to such questions are unknowable, these questions nevertheless
illustrate how federalism concerns may cause the court to limit
the scope of federal constitutional rights when applied against
the states. Further, these questions suggest reasons why state
courts should not accord such decisions presumptive validity for
state constitutional interpretation.
From the beginning of this century-long process of deter-
mining the federal constitutional limits on state activity, the Su-
preme Court has frequently expressed concern for the peroga-
tives of the sovereign states. In 1908, Mr. Justice Moody
cautioned in Twining v. New Jersey:19 5 "But whenever a new
limitation or restriction is declared it is a matter of grave im-
port, since, to that extent it diminishes the authority of the
State, so necessary to the perpetuity of our dual form of govern-
ment, and changes its relation to its people and to the Union." '198
During the incorporation debate, the possibility that the
scope of constitutional rights could be different in their direct
application against the federal government than in their indirect
application against the states was clearly recognized.1 9 7 This was
even more likely to occur under Justice Cardozo's approach in
Palko v. Connecticut.98 Under the Palko approach, certain pro-
tections in the Bill of Rights were enforced against the states by
a "process of absorption"1 9 into the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. These rights were absorbed not because they
were contained in the Bill of Rights,200 but because they were
195. 211 U.s. 78 (1908).
196. Id. at 92.
197. See generally Henkin, supra note 189.
198. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Justice Brennan attempted to dispel this possibility in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964), and Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960). See
also Brennan, supra note 183, at 777.
199. 302 U.S. at 326.
200. Id. at 325, 327.
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"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."20 1
Justice Harlan consistently warned that incorporation of
Bill of Rights' provisions into the fourteenth amendment's pro-
tections against certain state actions not only violated state sov-
ereignty, but would also dilute the substantive content of these
rights as against the federal government.20 2 When the Court held
in Duncan v. Louisiana20 3 that "the fourteenth amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were
they to be tried in federal court-would come within the sixth
amendment's guarantee, ' 20 4 Justice Harlan dissented, expressing
concern that "provisions of the Bill of Rights may be watered
down in the needless pursuit of uniformity. '20 5 In his view, this
happened two years later in Williams v. Florida,0 6 when the
Court held that states were not required to employ twelve-per-
son juries.
The internal logic of the selective incorporation doctrine can-
not be respected if the Court is both committed to interpreting
faithfully the meaning of the federal bill of rights and recogniz-
201. Id. at 325. For a further exposition of the difference between incorporation of
specific Bill of Rights' protections into the fourteenth amendment and absorption of pro-
tections in the due process notion of "immunities. .. implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466-72 (1947), and Brennan, supra note 183, at 769. In deter-
mining what was required under the Palko "ordered liberty approach," Justice Frank-
furter warned that "great tolerance toward a State's conduct is demanded of this Court."
329 U.S. at 470 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 438 (1945)).
202. In 1963 Justice Harlan cautioned that "if the court is prepared to relax Fourth
Amendment standards in order to avoid unduly fettering the States, this would be in
derogation of the law enforcement standards in the federal system-unless the Fourth
Amendment is to mean one thing for the States and something else for the Federal Gov-
ernment." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45-46 (1963). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 808 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-15, 27-28
(1964)(Harlan, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 116 (1964)(Harlan, J., con-
curring). See generally Welsh, supra note 12; Wilkinson, Justice John M. Harlan and
the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV. 1185 (1971).
203. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
204. Id. at 149.
205. Id. at 182 n.21. When the Court considered whether to apply Duncan v. Louisi-
ana retroactively, the states asserted reliance on past cases holding that the sixth
amendment right to jury trial did not apply to the states. This argument influenced the
Court's decision not to apply Duncan retroactively. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631,
634 (1968). See also Tehan v. U.S. ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 417 (1966)(declining to
apply retroactively Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
206. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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ing the governmental diversity that exists in this country."'
Today's decisions demonstrate a constitutional schizophre-
nia born of the need to cope with national diversity under the
constraints of the incorporation doctrine.. . . The. . . rule of
today's decisions simply reflects the lowest common denomina-
tor in the scope and function of the right to trial by jury in this
country.
208
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Ore-
gon,209 approving non-unanimous jury verdicts, seems to provide
further evidence of the "constitutional schizophrenia" of which
Justice Harlan warned. Indeed, Justice Powell recognized this
fact in his concurring opinion.210 But other members of the
Court steadfastly denied that incorporation would dilute the
substantive content of any federal constitutional right applied
against the federal government.21 At least three members of the
current Court, however, have expressed the view that constitu-
tional guarantees against government action can be more strin-
gent when applied to federal rather than state action. 12
The preceding discussion was not intended to prove that in-
corporation has diluted all Bill of Rights' protections, nor to sug-
gest that counsel and state courts search Supreme Court opin-
ions for evidence of such dilution. 13 Persons who believe the
Supreme Court has gone too far in applying constitutional rights
against the states would give little credence to this dilution the-
207. Id. at 129 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 136 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
210. 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring)(observing that the incorpora-
tion doctrine had contributed to the "dilution of federal rights").
211. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1970)(Black J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 116-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); Id. at
413 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
212. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978)(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 52-53
(Powell, J., dissenting); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978)(Powell, J., concur-
ring); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 632 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976)(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-77 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring).
213. Of course, there are cases, such as San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
quez, 401 U.S. 1, 44 (1973), which expressly contain federalism concerns. The Supreme
Court's 1976 death penalty decisions also contain such express references. See, e.g.,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176, 179, 186-87 (1976).
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ory. Those persons use federalism arguments to criticize Su-
preme Court decisions recognizing federal constitutional rights
against the states and to criticize commentators who support
such decisions.214 On the other hand, persons who support Su-
preme Court constitutional interpretations recognizing rights
against state action usually do not acknowledge the federalism
concerns discussed here. It simply cannot be denied, however,
that questions surrounding the scope of constitutional rights215
asserted against state governments are inextricably intertwined
with the structural issue of whether those rights apply against
the states.
Even after the Supreme Court decides to apply a constitu-
tional right against the states, the fact that such federal consti-
tutional interpretations apply a uniform national mandate to a
diverse group of state governments further influences the
Court's constitutional analysis. 216 State courts must always con-
sider this structural factor, roughly referred to as "federalism
concerns," when considering a state constitutional challenge
(previously rejected by the Supreme Court as a federal constitu-
tional challenge) because state courts, by definition, are not sub-
ject to the same federalism concerns.21 7 Also, state courts must
remember that independent state constitutional analysis is un-
necessary when the Supreme Court interprets the federal consti-
tution expansively.21 8 It is only when the Supreme Court de-
clines to recognize asserted federal constitutional rights that
state courts are called upon to interpret their constitutions inde-
pendently. In this ensuing "second look," state courts should al-
ways suspect federalism concerns, whether expressed or not, as a
contributing factor to the Supreme Court's decision against the
214. See, e.g., Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on
Democracy and Distrust, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 209 (1981).
215. This is true regardless of how the constitutional interpretation is approached.
See generally Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
216. See supra notes 202-211 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Howard, supra note 65, at 941. Several state courts have recog-
nized the absence of federalism concerns in rendering interpretations of state consti-
tutions that reject Supreme Court results under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Ser-
rano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766 n.46, 557 P.2d 929, 951 n.46, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367
n.46 (1977); State v. Sanders, 75 N.J. 200, 216-17, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (1977); Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 490-91, 303 A.2d 273, 281-82 (1973).
218. This is because litigants usually assert federal constitutional challenges first.
See supra notes 34, 119.
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asserted federal constitutional right.2 19 For these reasons, Su-
preme Court interpretations of the federal constitution as ap-
plied against the states should not be viewed as presumptively
valid precedent for state constitutional analysis.
C. The Position and Function of the State Judiciary
The typical state court system occupies a different institu-
tional position and performs a different judicial function from
its federal counterpart. The typical state constitution also differs
from its federal counterpart in many ways. Consequently, state
court judicial revew of state statutes or executive actions is or
should be qualitatively different from the Supreme Court's judi-
cial review of the same statutes or actions. These differences be-
tween the state and federal judicial systems and their respective
constitutions make presumptive validity of Supreme Court fed-
eral constitutional interpretations particularly inappropriate for
state constitutional analysis.
First, the typical state court's institutional position in the
state system is different from the Supreme Court's position in
the federal system. That is, the relationship between state su-
preme courts and state legislatures is fundamentally different
from the Supreme Court's relationship to Congress. Beginning
soon after independence, the balance of power between state leg-
islatures and judiciaries has been gradually shifting, increasing
judicial authority at the expense of legislative authority.220 In
fact, the legislative article of most state constitutions contains
many procedural and substantive restrictions on the legislature's
once unrestricted, plenary authority.221 The original state consti-
tutions did not include these restrictions, but they were later ad-
219. It has been reported that at least one member of the current Surpeme Court,
Justice Rehnquist, does not believe in incorporating the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment. Fiss and Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE Naw REPUBLIC,
March 10, 1982, at 14 (quoted in Note, The Eighth Amendment: Judicial Self-Restraint
and Legislative Power, 65 MAIQ. L. Rav. 434, 436 n.18 (1982)). See also Powell, The
Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982).
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HAv. L. REv. 293, 302
(1976) (noting "a kind of 'natural law' of states' rights" in Justice Rehnquist's opinions).
See also O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts
from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801 (1981).
220. Williams, supra note 2, at 201-02.
221. Id.
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ded in response to perceived abuses of state legislative authority.
Most of these restrictions are enforceable by state courts.222
Also, state courts quite obviously occupy a stronger position
vis-a-vis the state legislative and executive branches than does
the United States Supreme Court. This is not to discount the
judicial deference to which state legislative and executive actions
are entitled,22 but to highlight the extra measure of deference,
based upon federalism and other institutional concerns, which
the Supreme Court accords to state legislative and executive
action.22'
Further, state court decisions directly affect only the state
in which they are rendered. Judges and commentators often
note this fact in support of the idea of states as "laboratories";
in other words, ill-advised experiments will affect only the citi-
zens of the experimenting state. By the same token, however,
state courts are now limiting the effect of Supreme Court deci-
sions rejecting federal constitutional challenges by rendering in-
dependent state constitutional interpretations. 225 For all these
reasons, state courts are often deeply involved in the state's
ongoing policymaking process (constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional).226 Although the extent of this involvement may vary
222. Some state courts have determined that certain procedural restrictions on state
legislation contained in state constitutions are not judicially enforceable. See generally
Dodd, Judicial Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. Rav. 54
(1931); Grant, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure in California, 1 STAN. L. REv.
429 (1949); Note, Judicial Review of the Legislation Process of Enactment: An Assess-
ment Following Childers v. Coney, 30 ALA. L. REv. 495 (1979); Note, Pennsylvania En-
rolled Bill Rule: A Reappraisal in Light of HB1413 and Velasquez v. Depuy, 75 DICK. L.
REv. 123 (1970).
223. See generally Barrett, supra note 14; Singer, supra note 18; Wright, supra note
87.
224. See, e.g., State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 267-68, 448 A.2d 791,
794-95 (1982).
225. In discussing state court jurisdiction to interpret federal law, Professor Cover
has noted: "If there were a unitary source of norm articulation over a given domain, the
costs of error or lack of wisdom in any norm articulation would be suffered throughout
the domain." Cover, supra note 57, at 673.
226. H. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS 5 (1971): "State supreme courts
are not simply duplications of the national court at a lower level of the judicial hierar-
chy. Instead, they are distinctive institutions which are integral parts of state political
and legal systems." See also H. JAcoB & K. VINEs, POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 246 (3d ed. 1976)("[I]t becomes apparent that the state courts
make significant policies in many of the same substantive areas as the other organs of
government.").
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from state to state,227 such judicial involvement nevertheless re-
flects a very different institutional position from that occupied
by the United States Supreme Court.
Second, the typical state court's judicial function is different
from the Supreme Court's. For example, state courts have tradi-
tionally performed much nonconstitutional lawmaking. As Jus-
tice Linde observed:
When a state court alters the law of products liability, abol-
ishes sovereign or charitable tort immunity, redefines the in-
sanity defense, or restricts the range of self-exculpation in con-
tracts of adhesion, its action is rarely attacked as
"undemocratic." Nor is this judicial role peculiar to matters of
common law subject to legislative reversal. The accepted domi-
nance of courts in state law extends to their "anti-
majoritarian" role in review of their coordinate political
branches in state and local governments.22
Federal courts have been denied this general 229 lawmaking
power since 1938.230
Most state supreme courts promulgate law through
rulemaking powers. 231 They also exercise various "inherent pow-
ers," usually at the expense of the legislative branch.232 Once
thought to be legislative in nature, these powers have devolved
upon state judiciaries during this century.
227. Id. at 151; H. GLICK & K. Vmnss, STATE COURT SYSTEMS (1973); M. PORTER & G.
TARR, supra note 90 (The latter book contains an exhaustive and up-to-date bibliograph-
ical essay on state supreme courts by G. Alan Tarr.). Compare R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE (1978)(describing the New Jersey Supreme Court) with T. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA
SuPREME COURT. AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PoLcY ANALYSIS (1975); Porter and Tarr, The
New Judicial Federalism, and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHio
STATE L.J. 143 (1984).
228. Linde, supra note 22, at 248. See also Baum and Canon, State Supreme Courts
as Activists: New Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in M. PORTER & G. TARR, supra note
90, at 83. The "legitimacy" of such common-law decisions is sometimes attacked as in-
vading the province of the legislature. See generally Bischoff, The Dynamics of Tort
Law: Court or Legislature? 4 VT. L. REv. 35 (1979).
State Supreme Courts also pursue policy initiatives outside their formal judicial role
in the adversary process, including direct and indirect contact with legislators. See Glick,
Policy-Making and State Supreme Courts: The Judiciary as an Interest Group, 5 LAW
& Soc. REv. 271 (1970).
229. As to remaining areas of "federal common law," see Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
230. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
231. Williams, supra note 2, at 208-09.
232. Id. at 211-12.
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State supreme courts do not face the same overwhelming
caseload pressures and jurisdictional restrictions as does the
United States Supreme Court. Some state courts even have
"reach down" provisions, 33 enabling them to obtain jurisdiction
quickly over state constitutional conflicts requiring early resolu-
tion. Therefore, state courts are able to approach state constitu-
tional analysis on a narrower, more incremental basis23 4 than the
Supreme Court, which labors under intense pressure for broader,
more sweeping pronouncements.
Further, state courts may be viewed as closer to state affairs
and more accountable 23 5 than federal courts. Standing and jus-
ticiability barriers are usually lower at the state level.23 6 And in
certain areas, such as criminal procedure, state trial judges are
more experienced than federal judges in the problems of ad-
ministering Supreme Court formulations on a daily basis. Many
state judges now view their roles as sometimes requiring contro-
versial constitutional rulings.3 7
233. See, e.g., England, Hunter and Williams, Constitutional Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147, 193-96 (1980); England
and Williams, Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 221, 250-
53 (1981).
234. Cf. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 778-79 (1971).
235. See Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1351. See also Ladinsky and
Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 128; Moser,
Populism, A Wisconsin Heritage: Its Effect on Judicial Accountability in the State, 66
MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1982)(tracing various methods of ensuring judicial accountability); But
see Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection on the Characteristics of Judges Reconsid-
ered, 6 LAW & Soc'y REV. 591 (1972)(citing lack of difference between elected and ap-
pointed judges); Flango and Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection
Make: Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JusT. SYs. J. 25
(1979)(same).
In 1808 two Ohio judges were impeached apparently because they held a legislative
act unconstitutional. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrrunoNAL LimITATiONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 193
n.3 (6th ed. 1890).
236. Linde, supra note 22, at 248; Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v.
Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1400-
02 (1978).
237. Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 789, 791 (1981). See also Peterkort, The Conflict Between State and Federal
Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretation of
State Constitutions, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 158, 159 n.8 (1981). But see Karst, Book
Review, 28 STAN. L. REV. 829, 834-35 (1976)(correlating the method of judicial selection
with state constitutional activism).
A recent study concluded that state supreme court justices "have come to view their
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Third, state constitutional rights may differ qualitatively
from federal constitutional rights. Some state constitutions, for
example, grant or are judicially interpreted to provide citizens
with certain affirmative rights.238 These rights may require dif-
ferent and more aggressive judicial enforcement than is neces-
sary in federal constitutional law, which is concerned primarily
with limiting governmental power.
239
Also, the text of a state constitution may provide for state
judicial review of legislative and executive action.240 This is cer-
tainly true with respect to state supreme courts' advisory opin-
ions.24 1 In fact, judicial review itself was a phenomenon of state
law before Marbury v. Madison.242 And contrary to the federal
experience, most judiciary provisions of state constitutions have
been revised and ratified in this century without a serious strug-
gle over the exercise of judicial review.
State constitutions are generally longer and more detailed
than their federal counterpart. Many state constitutions directly
regulate or restrict state government activities. The state consti-
tution is a document that primarily limits the legislature.243
State courts interpreting state constitutions are therefore thrust
more deeply, and more often, into the affairs of the coordinate
branches of government 244 than is the Supreme Court.
role less conservatively. They seem to be less concerned with the stabilization and pro-
tection of property rights, more concerned with the individual and the downtrodden, and
more willing to consider rulings that promote social change." Kagan, Cartwright,
Freidman and Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STA. L.
REv. 121, 155 (1977).
238. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 240-43, 635
P.2d 108, 114-15 (1981).
239. Handier, supra note 164, at 205 (citing Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. at
331-32, 450 A.2d at 948-49 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). See
also Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 240, 635 P.2d at 114.
240. See, e.g., Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Judicial Re-
lief for Violations of Rights, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 102, 107-11 (1980); ILL. CONST. art. IV §
13 (1970)(whether a special act of the legislature is or could be governed by general law
is a judicial question).
241. See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 212-13; Comment, The State Advisory
Opinion in Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 81 (1975).
242. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Nelson, Changing Conceptions of
Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972).
243. Williams, supra note 2, at 178-79.
244. See generally Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. REv. 928 (1968).
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State judicial review, therefore, is not simply a miniature
replication of Supreme Court judicial review. Federal judicial re-
view since Marbury245 takes place in a unique institutional set-
ting. The "rediscovery" of state constitutional protections of
civil liberties after a generation of "federalized" civil rights law
is relatively recent. Thus, viewing Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of cognate federal constitutional provisions as presump-
tively valid for state constitutional analysis denigrates the im-
portance of state constitutional jurisprudence. Any attempt to
limit independent state constitutional interpretation in these
"second look" cases to only those cases fitting categorical formu-
lations, or meeting certain criteria, further frustrates state con-
stitutional processes. 241 This attempt, after less than a decade of
experience with truly independent state constitutional interpre-
tation, will stifle creative, state-specific constitutional jurispru-
dence in cases where none of the listed factors are present. In
fact, the formulation of criteria in New Jersey for disagreement
with the Supreme Court may have already had this effect.
24 7
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court does not have a monop-
oly on correct constitutional interpretation. This fact is a corner-
stone of federalism, justifying substantive disagreement by state
courts. Although factors such as textual differences between the
federal and state constitutions can certainly contribute to a state
court's reasoning, the presence of these factors should not be
viewed as a necessary condition precedent to independent analy-
sis, under state constitutions, of claims rejected by the United
States Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in its abortion
financing case, noted: "Harris v. McRae, as the decision of the
245. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. Of course, Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), invalidated a federal, not a state, statute. But the Marshall
Court soon invalidated state laws in cases such as Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & N. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 15-21 (2d ed. 1983).
246. Cf. Kehnan, supra note 55, at 414-15.
247. See, e.g., State v. Bass, 189 N.J. Super. 445, 459-61, 460 A.2d 214, 222 (Law
Div. 1983). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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highest court of a sister jurisdiction in which was resolved many
of the issues here raised, can afford this Court no more and no
less than helpful guidance."248 It is submitted that as a matter of
persuasive authority in state constitutional interpretation, Su-
preme Court interpretations of similar or identical federal con-
stitutional provisions are entitled to less weight than decisions
of sister state jurisdictions.2 4 9 Horizontal federalism, or reliance
upon decisions of other states, should be more persuasive. The
Supreme Court, and the Constitution it interprets, differ in too
many ways from state courts and state constitutions for that
Court's decisions to carry presumptive weight in state constitu-
tional analysis.250
The new state constitutional civil liberties movement has
struggled to move beyond process issues. Should state courts
disagree with the Supreme Court? If they do disagree, will their
decisions be insulated from Supreme Court review? How does
their analysis compare with the Supreme Court's? These ques-
tions illustrate the dominance of the federal constitutional law
point of view, and more specifically, Supreme Court decisions, in
present thought about constitutional law.25 1 State constitutional
law questions continue to be filtered almost exclusively through
the federal constitutional law perspective. That a state court dis-
agrees with the Supreme Court still seems more important than
the evolving state constitutional jurisprudence.
A state court may certainly be justified in declining re-
quested relief in a suit raising state constitutional challenges.
Such a result, however, should be based upon state constitu-
248. Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 66 PA. Comm. 70, 84, 444 A.2d 774, 781
(1982). See also State v. Kaluua, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974)
(same). An early commentator made the same point. See Falk, The State Constitution:
A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REv. 273, 283-84 (1973).
249. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
250. The Supreme Court occasionally even relies on state constitutional inter-
pretaitons in elaborating the federal constitution. See, e.g., Perry v. Louisiana, 103 S. Ct.
2438 (1983)(Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Williams, supra note 2, at 189
n.87.
In fact, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), cited with approval California's earlier
ruling on the right to abortion under the California Constitution, People v. Belous, 71
Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969). Cf. Morgan, Fundamental State
Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in Federal Equal-protection Review, 17 GA. L.
REv. 77 (1982)(fundamental state constitutional rights should trigger federal equal pro-
tection scrutiny).
251. Williams, supra note 2, at 228 n.275.
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tional analysis and not upon misplaced reliance upon Supreme
Court federal constitutional interpretations. The latter approach
constitutes an unwarranted delegation of state power to the Su-
preme Court and a resultant abdication of state judicial respon-
sibility.2 52 By the same token, state court dissenters remain free
to criticize the majority's reasoning and result, but they should
not blindly advocate allegiance to Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of a different Constitution.
252. As Justice Linde recently observed:
The point is not that a state's constitutional guarantees are more or less pro-
tective in particular applications, but that they were meant to be and remain
genuine guarantees against misuse of the state's governmental powers, truly
independent of the rising and failing tides of federal case-law both in method
and in specifics. State courts cannot abdicate their responsiblity for these inde-
pendent guarantees, at least not unless the people of the state themselves
choose to abandon them and entrust their rights entirely to federal law.
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, -, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (1983). See also "Judicial Prod-
uct," 69 A.B.A.J. 1356 (1983). See generally Linde, E. Pluribus-Constitutional Theory
and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984).
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